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Abstract
We propose a model of abduction based on the revision of the epistemic state of an agent.
Explanationsmust besufﬁcienttoinducebeliefinthesentence tobe explained(forinstance, some
observation),or ensure itsconsistency withother beliefs, ina manner thatadequately accounts for
factual and hypothetical sentences. Our model will generate explanations that nonmonotonically
predict an observation, thus generalizing most current accounts, which require some deductive
relationship between explanation and observation. It also provides a natural preference ordering
on explanations, deﬁned in terms of normality or plausibility. To illustrate the generality of our
approach, we reconstruct two of the key paradigms for model-based diagnosis, abductive and
consistency-based diagnosis, within our framework. This reconstruction provides an alternative
semantics for both and extends these systems to accommodate our predictive explanations and
semantic preferences on explanations. It also illustrates how more general information can be
incorporated in a principledmanner.
￿
Some parts of this paper appeared in preliminary form as “Abduction as Belief Revision: A Model of Preferred
Explanations,”Proc. of EleventhNational Conf. on Artiﬁcial Intelligence(AAAI-93), Washington,DC, pp.642–648(1993).To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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1 Introduction
It has become widely recognized that a lot of reasoning does not proceed in a “straightforward”
deductive manner. Reasonable conclusions cannot always be reached simply by considering the
logical consequences (relative to some background theory) of some known facts. A common pattern
of inference that fails to conform to this picture is abduction, the notionof ﬁnding an explanation for
the truth of some fact. For instance, if the grass is wet, one mightexplain this fact by postulatingthat
the sprinkler was turned on. This is certainly not a deductive consequence of the grass being wet (it
may well have rained).
Abductionhascometoplayacrucialroleinknowledgerepresentationandreasoning,acrossmany
areas of AI. In discourse interpretation, one often wants to ascribe beliefs to a speaker that explain a
particular utterance, perhaps gaining insight into the speaker’s intentions [30]. More generally, plan
recognition often proceeds abductively. In high-level scene interpretation [51], an interpretation can
be reached by postulating scene objects that explain the appearance of objects in an image. Probably
the most common use of abductive inference in AI is in the area of model-based diagnosis. Given
unexpected observations of the behavior of an artifact or system, a diagnosis is usually taken to be
someset ofcomponents,the malfunctioningof whichexplainsthese observations[14, 24, 17, 49, 43].
Traditionally, the process of abduction has been modeled by appeal to some sort of deductive
relation between the explanandum (or fact to be explained) and the explanation (the fact that renders
the explanandum plausible). Hempel’s [29] deductive-nomological explanations fall into this cate-
gory, requiring that the explanation entail the explanandum relative to some background knowledge.
Broadly speaking, this picture of abduction can be characterized as follows: an explanation for
￿
relative to background theory
￿ will be any
￿ that, together with
￿ , entails
￿
(usually with the
additional constraint that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ be consistent). Such a picture is adopted in much research on
abduction [54, 35, 50]. Theories of this type are, unfortunately, bound to the unrelenting nature of
deductive inference. There are three directions in which such theories must be generalized.
First, we should not require that an explanation deductively entail its observation (even relative
to some background theory). There are very few explanations that do not admit exceptions. The
sprinkler being on can explain the wet grass; but the sprinkler being on with a water main broken is
not a reasonable explanation. Yet thisexceptional conditiondoes not make theinitialexplanationany
less compelling. Rather it illustrates that explanations may entail their conclusions in a defeasible or
nonmonotonic sense.
Second, while there may be many competing explanations for a particular observation, certain of
these may be relatively implausible. While a tanker truck exploding in front of the yard may explainTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
1 INTRODUCTION 2
the wet grass in the sense described above, this is certainly not as reasonable an explanation as the
sprinkler beingturnedon. Thus, we require some notionof preference to choseamong thesepotential
explanations.
Third,thedeductivepictureofexplanationdoesnotallowonetoexplainfactsthatare inconsistent
with the background theory. Such explanations are, in fact, among the most important; for it is facts
that conﬂict with existing expectations that most urgently require explanation. This is the case in
diagnostic applications, for example, where observations to be explained contradict our belief that a
system is performing according to speciﬁcation.
The ﬁrst two of these problems can be addressed using, for example, probabilistic information
[29, 17, 46, 41]. We might simply require that an explanation render the observation sufﬁciently
probable. Explanations might thus be nonmonotonic in the sense that
￿ may explain
￿
, but
￿
￿
￿
￿
may not (e.g.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ may be sufﬁciently high while
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ may not). For instance, it is highly
likely that the grass becomes wet when the sprinkler is turned on, but it is unlikely to become wet
if the water main is broken. Preference can also be given to explanations that are more likely. A
tanker truck exploding in front of the yard is much less probable than the sprinkler being turned
on. There have been proposals to address these issues in a more qualitative manner using “logic-
based” frameworks also. Peirce (see Rescher [52]) discusses the “plausibility” of explanations, as
do Quine and Ullian [48]. Consistency-based diagnosis [49, 16] uses abnormality assumptions to
capture the context-dependence of explanations; and preferred explanations are those that minimize
abnormalities. Poole’s [44] assumption-based framework captures some of these ideas by explicitly
introducing a set of default assumptionsto account for the nonmonotonicityof explanations.
Inthispaperweproposeasemanticframeworkandlogicalspeciﬁcationofabductionthatcaptures
the spirit of probabilistic proposals, but does so in a qualitative fashion. Explanations are given a
defeasibleaspectthroughtheuseoftechniquesfordefaultreasoningandbeliefrevision. Furthermore,
explanations are viewed as more or less plausible according to a qualitative notion of plausibility,
a relation naturally induced by the preferences associated with our defaults. Finally, by relying on
existing theories of belief revision, explanations for facts that conﬂict with existing beliefs can be
provided. In particular, such conﬂicting observations will require explanations that themselves force
an agent to revise its beliefs.
Our account will take as central subjunctive conditionals of the form
￿
￿
￿
￿ , which can be
interpreted as assertingthat, if an agent were tobelieve
￿ itwould alsobelieve
￿ . Such a conditional
can be consistently held even if
￿ is believed to be false. This is the cornerstone of our notion of
explanation: if believing
￿ is sufﬁcient to induce belief in
￿ , then
￿ explains
￿ . This determines
a strong, predictive sense of explanation; but weaker forms of explanation can also be captured.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
2 ABDUCTION AND BELIEF REVISION 3
Semantically, suchconditionalsare interpretedrelativetoanorderingofplausibilityornormalityover
possible worlds. This ordering is taken to represent the epistemic state of an agent; thus all forms of
explanation we describe can be classiﬁed as epistemic explanations. Our conditional logic, described
in earlier work as a representation of belief revision and default reasoning [3, 7, 9], has the desired
nonmonotonicityand induces a natural preference ordering on sentences (hence explanations).
In the next section we describe abduction, belief revision, our conditional logics and other
necessary logical preliminaries. In Section 3, we discuss the concept of explanation, its epistemic
nature, and how different types of explanationscan be captured in our framework. We also introduce
the notionofpreferred explanations,showinghowthe sameconditionalinformationusedtorepresent
the defeasibilityof explanationsinducesa naturalpreference ordering. Todemonstratetheexpressive
power of our model, in Section 4 we show how Poole’s [43, 44] Theorist framework (without
constraints)andBrewka’s[12]extensionofTheoristcanbecapturedinourlogics. Thisreconstruction
explainssemanticallythenon-predictiveandparaconsistentnatureofexplanationsinTheorist. Italso
illustrates the correct manner in which to augment Theorist with a notion of predictive explanation
and how one should capture semantic preferences on Theorist explanations. These two abilities have
until now been unexplored in this canonical abductive framework. In Section 5, we reconstruct a
canonical theory of consistency-based diagnosis due to de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter [16, 49] in
our logics. This again suggests extensions of the theory and illustrates the natural similarities and
distinctions between consistency-based and abductive diagnosis.
Proofs of main theorems may be found in the appendix.
2 Abduction and Belief Revision
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss some previous work on abduction, drawing attention to the aspects
of these various proposals that inﬂuence our approach. We also describe the AGM model of belief
revision of Alchourr´ on, G¨ ardenfors and Makinson[2]; and we present the conditionallogics required
to capture thistheory ofrevision, dueto Boutilier[9]. Thiswillprovidethelogicalapparatus required
to describe the process of abduction in terms of belief revision.
2.1 Abduction
Abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws that render some sentence plausible,
that explain some phenomenon or observation. The sentence to be explained is often denoted the
explanandum. We willusetheterm“observation”instead,fortypicallyweareinterestedinexplaining
someobservedfact. Thisismerelysuggestive,however,forhypotheticalpossibilitiescanbeexplainedTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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as well. The sentences (facts or laws) doing the explainingare often dubbed the explanans sentences.
Though the term is often used to characterize this inference process, we will use “explanation” more
simply to refer to the explanans sentences. Thus, an explanation renders an observation plausible (in
some yet to be determined sense).
Themostbasicand,insomeidealizedsense, themostcompellingformofabductionisrepresented
by Hempel’s [29] deductive-nomological explanations. Such explanations consist of certain speciﬁc
facts and universal generalizations (scientiﬁc laws) that, taken together, deductively entail a given
observation. Forexample, theobservation“Thisthingﬂies”canbeexplainedbythefact“Thisthingis
abird”andthelaw“Allbirdsﬂy.” AsHempelobserves, oftenpartsoftheexplanationareleftunstated
withtheexplicitlyprovidedexplanationbeingelliptical. Ifitisunderstoodamongparticipantsinsome
discourse that all birds ﬂy, then “This thing is a bird” alone is a reasonable explanation. Suppose we
take
￿ to be some theory capturing the relevant background knowledge (this may be some scientiﬁc
or commonsense theory). Then the sentence
￿ explains observation
￿
just when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
We will be less concerned withthe nomologicalaspects of abduction, assumingthat relevant laws are
captured in some background theory.1 Thus, our notionof explanation will be elliptical in this sense,
taking background information for granted.
The criteria for deductive explanations are clearly too strong to allow wide applicability. In
commonsensereasoningandscientiﬁcinquiryvery few explanationshave suchstrength. One accepts
as a reasonable explanation for wet grass that the sprinkler was turned on; but this explanation is
not (deductively) conclusive. The grass may have been covered by a tarpaulin, the water pressure
may have fallen at a crucial instance, any of a number of other exceptional conditionscan defeat this
inference. Ofcourse,wemayclaimthat“thesprinklerwasturnedon”iselliptical,implicitlyassuming
that none of these exceptional circumstances hold, and thatthe true explanationincludesthe denial of
these. However, this runs into the qualiﬁcation problem of default reasoning, the problem of having
to know that such conditions are false [38]. This view is also untenable when such qualiﬁcations
cannot be listed, or the phenomenon in question is inherently probabilistic(at least, given our current
knowledge). To take an example of Hempel, Jim’s close exposure to his brother who has the measles
explains Jim catching the measles; but it certainly doesn’t imply Jim catching the measles.
A numberof methodsfor specifying probabilisticexplanationshave been proffered. Hempel [29]
1In fact, as we will see in Section 3, the “theory” is implicit in the epistemic state of our reasoning agent. We will have
a few things to say about laws in our framework in the concluding section.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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requires that the explanation make the observation highly probable. Thus, probabilistic explanations
stillretaintheessentialpredictivepowerofdeductiveexplanations. Otheraccountsmakelessstringent
requirements. For instance, G¨ ardenfors [22] insists only that the explanation render the observation
more probable than itis a priori. A key componentof the G¨ ardenfors theoryis thatthe judgementsof
probabilityare rendered withrespect to the epistemicstate of an agent. We return to thisin Section 3.
Because of their probabilistic nature, such explanations are nonmonotonic or defeasible. It
may be that SprinklerOn explains WetGrass, since this observation is very probable given the
explanation. ButthestrongerpropositionSprinklerOn
￿ Covered isnotareasonableexplanation,
for theprobabilityof wet grass isquitelow inthiscase. Ourgoal isto capture thistypeof explanation
in a qualitative fashion. Rather than relying on probabilistic information, we will provide an account
of defeasible explanations based on the “default rules” held by an agent.
Bothdeductiveandprobabilisticmodelsofabductiontypicallygiverisetoa numberofcompeting
explanations for a given observation. The propositions Rain and SprinklerOn both explain
WetGrass. If an agent has to choose among competingexplanations, there must exist some criteria
for this choice. An obvious preference criterion on explanations is based on the likelihood of the
explanations themselves. An agent should choose the most probable explanation relative to a given
context. Such accounts are often found in diagnosis [46, 15] and most probable explanations are
discussed by Pearl [41]. In a more qualitative sense, one might require that adopted explanation(s)
be among the most “plausible.” This view is advocated by Peirce (see Rescher [52]) and Quine and
Ullian [48]. The notion of minimal diagnosisin the consistency-based models of diagnosis[49] is an
attempt to qualitatively characterize most probable diagnoses. We will provide a formal framework
in which such qualitative judgements of plausibilitycan be made.
One of the areas of AI that most frequently appeals to abductive inference is model-based di-
agnosis. Given a theory describing the correct behavior of some system or artifact, one can make
predictions about itsbehavior based on some given information. One mightexpect a certain observa-
tion based on information about other parts of the system. For example, given the inputs to a digital
circuit, the background theory (or system description) allows one to deduce the value of the outputs.
Should the actual observation differ from the expected observation then the systemmustnot conform
to the system description (assumingthe input values are correct). The goal of model-based diagnosis
is to discover an explanation for the aberrant behavior, usually some set of components of the system
that, ifbehavingabnormally,willentailorexcuse theactualobservation. The twomainparadigmsfor
model-baseddiagnosisare theabductive approaches, of whichPoole’s [43, 44] Theoristframework is
representative, andconsistency-basedmodelssuchasthatofdeKleer, MackworthandReiter [16, 49].
These will be discussed in detail in Sections 4 and 5.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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2.2 Conditionalsand Belief Revision
The account of abduction we propose relies heavily on the notion of belief revision. For instance,
a predictive explanation requires that belief in the explanation be sufﬁcient to induce belief in the
observation. Therefore we must be able to test the epistemic state of an agent after it (hypothetically)
adoptsapotentialexplanation,ortestaknowledgebaseonceitisrevisedtoincorporatetheexplanation.
A theory of belief revision thus lies at the core of epistemic explanation.
We assume an agent to have a deductively closed set of beliefs
￿
taken from some underlying
language. For concreteness, we will assume this language
￿ CPL to be that of classical propositional
logic generated by some set of variables P. We will often take
￿
to be the closure of some ﬁnite set
of premises, or knowledge base, KB; so
￿
￿ Cn
￿ KB
￿ . The expansion of
￿
by new information
￿
is the belief set
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . This is a seemingly reasonable method of belief change when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . More troublesome is the revision of
￿
by
￿ when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Some beliefs in
￿
must be
given up before
￿ can be accommodated. The problem lies in determining which part of
￿
to give
up. Alchourr´ on, G¨ ardenfors and Makinson [2] have proposed a theory of revision (the AGM theory)
based on the following observation: the least “entrenched” beliefs in
￿
should be given up and
￿
added to this contracted belief set.
We use
￿
￿
￿
￿ to denote the belief set resultingwhen
￿
is revised by
￿ . The AGM theory logically
delimits the scope of acceptable revision functions. To this end, the AGM postulates below are
maintained to hold for any reasonable notion of revision [22].
(R1)
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a belief set (i.e. deductively closed).
(R2)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(R3)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(R4) If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(R5)
￿
￿
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(R6) If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(R7)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(R8) If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
The semantics of AGM revision functions will be described below.
An alternative model of revision is based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment [22]. Given a
belief set
￿
, we can characterize the revision of
￿
by ordering beliefs according to our willingnessTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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to give them up when necessary. If one of two beliefs must be retracted in order to accommodate
some new fact, the least entrenched belief will be relinquished, while the most entrenched persists.
G¨ ardenfors [22]presentsﬁvepostulatesforsuchanorderingandshowsthattheseorderingsdetermine
exactly thespace ofrevisionfunctionssatisfyingtheAGMpostulates. We let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ denotethe fact
that
￿ isat leastas entrenched as
￿ intheory
￿
. A completeset ofsentences of thisform issufﬁcient
to specify a revision function. We note that the dual of an entrenchment ordering is a plausibility
ordering on sentences. A sentence
￿ is more plausible than
￿ just when
￿
￿ is less entrenched than
￿
￿ , and means that
￿ would be more readily accepted than
￿ if the opportunity arose. Grove [28]
studied this relationship and its connection to the AGM theory.
Another form of belief change studied within the AGM theory is the process of contraction, or
rejecting a belief in a belief set. When the belief set
￿
is contracted by
￿ , the resulting belief set
￿
￿
￿
￿
is such that
￿ is no longer held. The AGM theory provides a set of postulatesfor contraction as well.
This process is related to revision via the Levi and Harper identities:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
2.2.1 The Logics CO and CO*
Boutilier [9] presents a family of bimodal logics suitable for representing and reasoning about the
revision of a knowledge base. We brieﬂy review the logics and associated possible worlds semantics
for revision. We refer to [9] for further details and motivation.
Semantically, the process of revision can be captured by considering a plausibility ordering
over possible worlds. We can reason about such structures, as well as AGM revision (and several
generalizationsofit),usingafamilyofbimodallogics. Thelanguage
￿ B isabimodallanguageformed
from a denumerable set
￿ of propositional variables, together with the usual classical connectives
and two modaloperators
￿ and
￿
￿ . Intuitively,
￿
￿
￿ is read as “
￿ holdsat all equallyor more plausible
worlds,” while
￿
￿
￿ isread“
￿ holdsatalllessplausibleworlds.” We denoteby
￿ CPL thepropositional
sublanguage of
￿ B. We will deﬁne four bimodal logics based on this language.
Oursemanticsisbasedonstructuresconsistingofasetofpossibleworlds
￿ andabinaryordering
relation
￿
over
￿ , reﬂecting the relative degree of plausibilityof worlds. The interpretation of
￿
is
as follows:
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿ is at least as plausible as
￿
.2 As usual,
￿ is more plausible than
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
but not
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Plausibility is a pragmatic measure that reﬂects the degree to which one is
willing to accept
￿
as a possible state of affairs. If
￿ is more plausible than
￿
, loosely speaking,
￿ is
2Having “more” plausible elements denoted as “lesser” in the ordering is consistent with the usual AI practice of
preferring minimal elements in some ordering — in this case, the more plausible worlds.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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“more consistent” with an agent’s beliefs than
￿
. We take reﬂexivity and transitivity to be minimal
requirements on
￿
, dubbing any such model a CT4O-model.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [7] A CT4O-model is a triple
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,where
￿ is a set (of possible worlds),
￿
is a reﬂexive, transitive binary relation on
￿ (the ordering relation), and
￿ maps
￿ into 2
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿ is the set of worlds where
￿ is true).
Sentences in
￿ B are interpreted in the usual way, with the truth of a modal formula at world
￿
in
￿
(where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ means
￿ is true at
￿
) given by
1.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff for each
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
2.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff for each
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ we say that
￿
satisﬁes
￿ at
￿
. For any sentence
￿ , we use
￿
￿
￿
￿ to denote the set of
worlds
￿
￿
￿ that satisfy
￿ (assuming some ﬁxed
￿
). Each world in this set is an
￿ -world. For
an arbitrary set of formulae
￿ , we use
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ to denote those worlds satisfying each
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and refer to
these as
￿ -worlds. Somewhat looselywe dub those worlds that falsify some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ to be
￿
￿ -worlds.
We now deﬁne several new connectives as follows:
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
￿ ;
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ;
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ;
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
It is easy to verify that these connectives have the following truth conditions:
(a)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff for some
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(b)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff for some
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(c)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff for all
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
(d)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff for some
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
These connectives have the obvious readings:
￿
￿ means “
￿ is true at all equally or more plausible
worlds”;
￿
￿ means “
￿ is true at some equally or more plausible world”;
￿
￿
￿ means “
￿ is true
at all less plausible (and incomparable) worlds”;
￿
￿
￿ means “
￿ is true at some less plausible (or
incomparable) world”;
￿
￿
￿ means “
￿ is true at all worlds, whether more or less plausible”; ﬁnally,
￿
￿
￿ means “
￿ is true at some world, whether more or less plausible.” Validity and satisﬁability are
deﬁned in a straightforward manner and a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic CT4O is
provided in [7].To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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ABC ABC
AB AB
AB
A
   More
Plausible
AB AB
AB
(a) CT4O-model (b) CO-model
Figure 1: CT4O and CO models
A naturalrestrictionon theorderingofplausibilityisconnectedness; thatis, forany pairof worlds
￿
￿
￿ , either
￿
￿
￿
or
￿
￿
￿
￿ . In otherwords, allworldsmusthave comparable degrees of plausibility.
This restriction gives rise to the logic CO (again axiomatized in [7]).
Deﬁnition 2.2 [7] A CO-model is a triple
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , where
￿
is a CT4O-model and
￿
is
totally connected.
In any reﬂexive, transitive Kripke frame, a cluster is any maximal mutually accessible set of
worlds [53]: a set
￿
￿
￿ is a cluster just when
￿
￿
￿
for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and no extension
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
has this property. We note that CO-structures consist of a totally-ordered set of clusters of equally
plausibleworlds,whileCT4O-modelsconsistofapartially-orderedsetofclusters. Figure1illustrates
this, where each large circle denotes a cluster of equally plausible worlds and arrows point in the
direction of increasing plausibility.
Finally, both CT4O and CO can be extended by restricting attention to those structures in which
all logically possible worlds are represented. No matter how implausible, each should be somehow
ranked and should occur in our models. This property turns out to be crucial in characterizing the
AGM theory of belief revision.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [7] Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ be a Kripke model. For all
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
is deﬁned as the map
from P into
￿ 0
￿ 1
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1 iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (
￿
￿
is the valuation associated with
￿
).
CT4O*-models and CO*-models are (respectively) CT4O-models and CO-models satisfying theTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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condition that
￿
￿
:
￿
maps P into
￿ 0
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
This restriction is captured axiomatically determining the logics CT4O* and CO* [7].
2.2.2 Modeling Belief Revision
Assumewehavea ﬁxed(CO- orCT4O-) model
￿
. We usemin
￿
￿
￿ todenotethesetofmostplausible
￿ -worlds in
￿
:3
min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
implies
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
In both models in Figure 1, the shaded regions denote the worlds that make up min
￿
￿
￿ .
The revision of a belief set
￿
can be represented using CT4O- or CO-models that reﬂect the
degree of plausibilityaccorded to worlds by an agent in such a belief state. To capture revision of
￿
,
we insistthat any such
￿
-revision model be such that
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿
￿ ; that is, the model must have a
(unique) minimal cluster formed by
￿
￿
￿ .4 This reﬂects the intuition that all and only
￿
-worlds are
most plausible for an agent with belief set
￿
[9], and corresponds to a form of only knowing [36, 4].
The CT4O-model in Figure 1(a) is a
￿
-revision model for
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , while the CO-model in
Figure 1(b) is suitable for
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Torevise
￿
by
￿ ,weconstructtherevisedset
￿
￿
￿ byconsideringthesetmin
￿
￿
￿ ofmostplausible
￿ -worlds in
￿
. In particular, we require that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿ ; thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿ is true at each of
the most plausible
￿ -worlds. We can deﬁne a conditional connective
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿ is true in
just such a case:
￿
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
This is equivalent to the requirement that
min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Both models in Figure 1 satisfy
￿
￿
￿ , since
￿ holds at each world in min
￿
￿
￿ , the shaded regions
of the models.
The Ramsey test [57] provides acceptance conditionsfor subjunctiveconditionals of the form “If
￿ were the case, then
￿ would hold” by appeal to belief revision. Indeed, the conditional should be
accepted justwhen an agent, hypotheticallyrevisingits beliefs by
￿ , accepts
￿ . Thus, we can equate
3We assume, for simplicity, that such a (limiting) set exists for each
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ CPL, though the following technical
developmentsdo not require this [7, 9].
4This constraint can be expressedin the object languageLB; see [9, 4].To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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the conditional
￿
￿
￿ with the statement
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and interpret our conditional as a certain type of
epistemic subjunctive conditional. For a speciﬁc
￿
-revision model we can deﬁne the revised belief
set
￿
￿
￿ as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ CPL :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Boutilier [9] shows that the revision functions determined by CO*-models are exactly those that
satisfy the AGM postulates. The revision functions captured by the weaker logics impose slightly
weaker constraints on the revision functions: CT4O and CT4O* fail to satisfy postulate (R8), while
CT4O and CO satisfy slightly weaker versions of most of the postulates. Intuitively, a
￿
-revision
model captures the epistemic state of an agent, both its beliefs and its revision policies. A belief
connective can be deﬁned in the object language:5
B
￿
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
We brieﬂy describe the contraction of
￿
by
￿
￿ in this semantic framework. To retract belief in
￿
￿ , we simplyaccept the worldsinmin
￿
￿
￿ asepistemicallypossiblewithoutrejectingthe possibility
of
￿
-worlds. In other words,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿
This is due to the fact that certain
￿ -worlds must become epistemically possible if
￿
￿ is not to be
believed, and the principle of minimal change suggests that only the most plausible
￿ -worlds should
be accorded this status. The belief set
￿
￿
￿
￿ does not contain
￿
￿ , and this operation captures the
AGM modelof contraction ifwe restrictour attentiontoCO*-models. In Figure 1(a)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿ ,
while in Figure 1(b)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
A key distinction between CT4O and CO-models is illustrated in Figure 1: in a CO-model, all
worlds in min
￿
￿
￿ must be equally plausible, while in CT4O this need not be the case. Indeed, the
CT4O-model shownhas two maximallyplausiblesets of
￿ -worlds(the shaded regions), yetthese are
incomparable. We denote the set of such incomparable subsets of min
￿
￿
￿ by
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
is a cluster
￿
Thus, we have that min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Taking each such subset (each element of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) to be a
plausible revised state of affairs rather than their union, we can deﬁne a weaker notion of revision
using the following connective. It reﬂects the intuition that the consequent
￿ holds within some
5See [4] for a more comprehensivedeﬁnition of belief and a proof of correspondenceto the belief logic weak S5.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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element of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ df
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
The model in Figure 1(a) shows the distinction: it satisﬁes neither
￿
￿
￿ nor
￿
￿
￿
￿ , but both
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿ . There is a set of comparable most plausible
￿ -worlds that satisﬁes
￿ and one
that satisﬁes
￿
￿ . Notice that this connective is paraconsistent in the sense that both
￿ and
￿
￿ may
be “derivable” from
￿ , but
￿
￿
￿
￿ is not. However,
￿ and
￿ are equivalent in CO, since min
￿
￿
￿
must lie within a single cluster. This weak connective will be primarily of interest when we examine
the Theorist system in Section 4.
We deﬁne theplausibilityofa propositionby appealingtothe plausibilityorderingon worlds. We
judge a propositionto be just as plausibleas the mostplausible worldat which thatpropositionholds.
For instance, if
￿ is consistent with a belief set
￿
, then it will be maximally plausible — the agent
considers
￿ tobeepistemicallypossible. We cancompare therelativeplausibilityoftwopropositions
semantically:
￿ is at least as plausible as
￿ just when, for every
￿ -world
￿
, there is some
￿ -world
that is at least as plausible as
￿
. This is expressed in
￿ B as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . If
￿ is (strictly) more
plausible than
￿ , then as we move away from
￿
￿
￿ , we will ﬁnd an
￿ -world before a
￿ -world; thus,
￿ is qualitatively “more likely” than
￿ . In each model in Figure 1,
￿
￿
￿ is more plausible than
￿
￿
￿
￿ . We note that in CO-models plausibility totally orders propositions; but in CT4O, certain
propositions may be incomparable by this measure.
2.2.3 Default Rules and Expectations
The subjunctive conditionals deﬁned above have many properties one would expect of default rules.
In particular, the conditional is defeasible. For instance, one can assert that if it rains the grass
will get wet (
￿
￿
￿ ), but that it won’t get wet if the grass is covered (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). As
subjunctive conditionals, these refer to an agent adopting belief in the antecedent and thus accepting
the consequent. In this case, the most plausible
￿
-worlds must be different from the most plausible
￿
￿
￿ -worlds.
These conditionals have much the same character as default rules. Recently, a number of condi-
tional logics have been proposed for default reasoning [18, 26, 33, 34]. In particular, Boutilier [7]
has proposed using the logics CT4O and CO together with the conditional
￿ for default reasoning.
To use the logics for this purpose requires simplythat we interpret the ordering relation
￿
as ranking
worlds according to their degree of normality. On this interpretation,
￿
￿
￿ means that
￿ holds
at the most normal
￿ -worlds; that is, “If
￿ then normally
￿ .” These default logics are shown to be
equivalenttothepreferential and rationalconsequence operationsofLehmann[33, 34]. Theyare alsoTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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equivalent to the logic of arbitrarily high probabilitiesproposed by Adams [1] and further developed
by Goldszmidtand Pearl [26], and can be given a probabilistic interpretation [7].
Boutilier[9]alsoshowshowdefaultreasoningbasedonsuchaconditionallogiccanbeinterpreted
as a form of belief revision, hence explaining the equivalence of the conditional logic representation
of both processes. G¨ ardenfors and Makinson’s [23] notion of expectation inference adopts a similar
viewpoint. Roughly, we think of default rules of the form
￿
￿
￿ as inducing various expectations
about the normal state of affairs. In particular, for any such default an agent expects the sentence
￿
￿
￿ to be true in the most normal state of affairs. An agent without speciﬁc knowledge of a
particular situation should then adopt, as a “starting point,” belief in this theory of expectations. In
other words, an agent’s “initial” beliefs should be precisely its default expectations. When speciﬁc
facts
￿
are learned, the agent can revise this belief set according to the revision model capturing its
default rules. The revised belief set will then correspond precisely to the set of default conclusions
the agent would reach by performing conditional default reasoning from this set of facts using its
conditionaldefault rules (see [9] for details). For thisreason, our theoryof explanationcan be usedin
one of two ways. We may thinkof explanationsrelative to the epistemicstate of an agent. This is the
viewpoint adopted in Section 3 where we present our theory. We may also interpret the conditionals
involved in explanationas default rules. This interpretationwillbe implicitin Sections 4 and 5 in our
reconstruction of model-baseddiagnosis,where plausibilityorderings are infact normalityorderings.
3 Epistemic Explanations
Often scientiﬁc explanations are postulated relative to some background theory consistingof various
scientiﬁc laws, principles and facts. In commonsense domains, this background theory should be
thoughtofasthebeliefsetofsomeagent. Wewillthereforedeﬁneexplanationsrelativetotheepistemic
state of someagentor program. We assumethisagent topossessan objective(or propositional)belief
set
￿
. We also assume the agent to have certain judgements of plausibility and entrenchment at its
disposal to guide the revision of its beliefs. These may be reﬂected in the conditionals held by the
agent, explicitstatementsofplausibility,oranyother sentencesinthebimodallanguagethatconstrain
admissible plausibility orderings. Such a theory may be complete — in the sense that it determines
a unique plausibilityordering — or incomplete. For simplicity, we assume (initially) that an agent’s
theory is complete and that its epistemic state is captured by a single
￿
-revision model. We discuss
laterhowonemightcompactlyaxiomatizesuchacategoricaltheory,andhowexplanationsarederived
for incomplete theories.
Deﬁning explanations relative to such structured epistemic states extends the usual deductive andTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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probabilisticapproaches. There an explanationmustbeadded toan agent’s “theory”to accountfor an
observation. Thisrestrictiveviewprecludes meaningfulexplanationsofobservationsotherthanthose
consistentwith
￿
. Infact, itisoftenexplanationsforobservationsthatconﬂictwithourcurrentbeliefs
inwhichwearemostinterested. Thus,amodelofbeliefrevisionseemscrucialforexplanationsofthis
sort. In order to account for such explanations, one must permit the belief set (or background theory)
to be revised in some way that allows consistent explanations of such observations. G¨ ardenfors [22]
has proposed a model of abduction that relies crucially on the epistemic state of the agent doing the
explaining. Our model ﬁnds its origins in his account, but there are several crucial differences. First,
G¨ ardenfors’s modelisprobabilisticwhereas ourmodelisqualitative. Aswell, our modelwillprovide
a predictive notion of explanation (in a sense described below). In contrast, G¨ ardenfors makes no
such requirement, counting as explanations facts that only marginally affect the probability of an
observation. However, we share with G¨ ardenfors the idea that explanations may be evaluated with
respect to states of belief other than that currently held by an agent.
Levesque’s [35] account of abduction is also based on the notion of an epistemic state. Levesque
allows the notion of “belief” to vary (from the standard deductively-closed notion) within his frame-
work in order to capture different types of explanation (e.g., a syntax-motivated notion of simplest
explanation). Our model is orthogonal in that the notion of “implication” between explanation and
observation is weakened.
In this section, we introduce several forms of epistemic explanation and their characterization
in terms of revision. There are two key dimensions along which these forms of explanation are
compared, predictive power and the epistemic status of the observation to be explained.
If belief in the explanation is sufﬁcient to induce belief in the observation, the explanation is said
tobe predictive. Deductive-nomologicalexplanationshavethisform, as doprobabilisticexplanations
based on high probability. However, weaker, non-predictive explanations are also of interest. These
must simply render the observation reasonable, without necessarily predicting it. Consistency-based
diagnosis adopts this perspective. Exposure to a virus may explain one’s having a cold without
having the predictive power to induce the belief that one will catch cold (prior to observing the cold).
Predictiveandnon-predictiveexplanationsarediscussedinSections3.1and3.2,respectively. Wewill
also distinguish two forms of non-predictive explanations: weak explanations and the even weaker
might explanations.
Explanations may also be categorized according to the epistemic status of the explanandum, or
“observation” to be explained. There are two types of sentences that we may wish to explain: beliefs
and non-beliefs. If
￿
is a belief held by the agent, it requires a factual explanation, some other belief
￿ that might have caused the agent to accept
￿
. This type of explanation is clearly crucial in manyTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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reasoning applications. An intelligent program will provide conclusions of various types to a user;
but a user should expect a program to be able to explain how it reached such a belief, or to justify its
reasoning. We may ask a robot to explain its actions, or an expert system to explain its predictions.
The explanation should clearly be given in terms of other (perhaps more fundamental) beliefs held
by the program. When explaining belief in
￿
, a program or agent that offers a disbelieved sentence
￿ is performing in a misleading manner. A second type of explanation is hypothetical: even if
￿
is
not believed, we may want an explanation for it, some new belief the agent could adopt that would
be sufﬁcient to ensure belief in
￿
. This counterfactual reading turns out to be quite important in AI,
for instance, in diagnostic tasks (see below), planning, and so on [25]. For example, if turning on the
sprinkler explains the grass being wet and an agent’s goal is to wet the grass, then it may well turn on
the sprinkler. We can further distinguishhypothetical explanations into those where observation
￿
is
rejected in
￿
(i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
) and those where observation
￿
is indeterminate in
￿
(i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
). Regardless of the predictive power required of an explanation, factual and hypothetical
explanations will require slightlydifferent treatment.
The type of explanation one requires will usually depend on the underlying application. For
instance, we will see that hypothetical explanations, whether predictive or non-predictive, play a key
role in diagnosis. Whatever the chosen form of explanation, certain explanations will be deemed
more plausible than others and will be preferred on those grounds. We will introduce a model of
preference in Section 3.3 that can be used to further distinguishexplanations in this fashion.
3.1 Predictive Explanations
In very many settings, we require that explanations be predictive; that is, if an agent were to adopt
a belief in the explanation, it would be compelled to accept the observation. In other words, the
explanation should be sufﬁcient to induce belief in the observation. Legal explanations, discourse
interpretation, goal regression in planning, and diagnosis in certain domains all make use of this type
of explanation.
To determine an appropriate deﬁnition of predictive explanation, we consider the factual and
hypothetical cases separately. If the observation
￿
is believed, as argued above, we require that a
suitable explanation
￿ also be believed. For example, if asked to explain the belief WetGrass, an
agent might choose between Rain and SprinklerOn. If it believes the sprinkler is on and that
it hasn’t rained, then Rain is not an appropriate explanation. This leads to our ﬁrst condition on
explanations: if observation
￿
isaccepted (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
) then any explanation
￿ mustalso be accepted
(i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
).
If
￿
is not believed, it may be rejected or indeterminate. In the ﬁrst instance, where
￿
is rejected,To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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we insist that any explanation
￿ also be rejected (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
). If this were not the case then
￿
would be consistent with
￿
. According to the AGM theory and our model of revision, this means
that accepting
￿ wouldbetantamounttoadding
￿ to
￿
, and
￿
￿
wouldstillbe believed. For example,
suppose an agent believesthe grass isnot wet and thatthe sprinklermay or maynot be on. To explain
(or ensure) wet grass, it should not accept the sprinkler being on (or turn it on), for according to its
beliefs the sprinkler may well be on — yet the grass is not believed to be wet.
In the second instance, where
￿
is indeterminate, we insist that any explanation also be indeter-
minate (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
). If
￿
￿
￿
, clearly accepting
￿ causes no change in belief and does
not render
￿
believed. Dismissing explanations
￿ where
￿
￿
￿
￿
requires more subtle justiﬁcation.
Intuitively,when
￿
isindeterminate,itisanepistemicpossibilityfortheagent: foralltheagentknows
￿
could betrue. If thisis thecase, itshouldbe explainedwithsomesentence thatisalsoepistemically
possible. If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
the agent knows
￿ to be false, so it should not be willing to accept it as an
explanation of some fact
￿
that might be true. Since learning
￿
conﬂicts with none of its beliefs, so
too should a reasonable explanation be consistent with its beliefs. For example, suppose an agent is
unsure whether or not the grass is wet, but believes that it hasn’t rained. Upon learning the grass is
wet, accepting rain as an explanation seems unreasonable.6
Combining these criteria for both factual and hypothetical explanations, we have the following
condition relating the epistemic status of observation
￿
and explanation
￿ :
(ES)
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
Assuming an agent to possess a unique revision model
￿
reﬂecting its current epistemic state, we
can express this in the object language as
￿
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
￿
If the epistemic state is captured by some (possibly incomplete) theory in the language
￿ B, we can
test this condition using entailment in the appropriate bimodal logic.
We note here that this condition relating the epistemic status of explanation and observation is at
odds with one prevailing view of abduction, which takes only non-beliefs to be valid explanations.
On this view, to offer a current belief
￿ as an explanation is uninformative; abduction should be
an “inference process” allowing the derivation of new beliefs. We take a somewhat different view,
assuming that observations are not (usually) accepted into a belief set until some explanation is
found and accepted. In the context of its other beliefs, observation
￿
is unexpected to a greater or
6Below we will brieﬂy explanationswhere this condition is weakened.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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lesser degree. Unexplained “belief” in
￿
places the agent in a state of cognitive dissonance. An
explanation relieves thisdissonance when it is accepted [22]. After this process bothexplanation and
observation are believed. Thus, the abductive process should be understood in terms of hypothetical
explanations: when it is realized what could have caused belief in an (unexpected) observation,
both observation and explanation are incorporated. In this sense, our use of the term observation is
somewhat nontraditional— it is a fact that has yet to be accepted (in somesense) as a belief. Factual
explanations are retrospective in the sense that they (should) describe “historically” what explanation
was actually adopted for a certain belief. We will continue to call such beliefs “observations,” using
the term generally to denote a fact to be explained.
Apart from the epistemic status of observation and explanation, we must address the predictive
aspect of explanations. In particular, we require that adoptingbelief in the explanation
￿ be sufﬁcient
to induce belief in the observation
￿
. The obvious criterion is the following predictive condition:
(P)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
which isexpressedintheobject languageas
￿
￿
￿
. Thiscaptures theintuitionthatIftheexplanation
were believed, so too would be the observation [37]. For hypothetical explanations, this seems
sufﬁcient, but for factual explanations (where
￿
￿
￿
), this condition is trivialized by the presence of
(ES). For once we insist that a valid explanation
￿ be in
￿
, we have
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
; and clearly
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
for any belief
￿ . But surely arbitrary beliefs should not count as valid explanations for other beliefs.
The belief that grass is green should not count as an explanation for the belief that the grass is wet.
In order to evaluate the predictive force of factual explanations, we require that the agent (hypo-
thetically) give up its belief in
￿
and then ﬁnd some
￿ that would (in this new belief state) restore
￿
.
In otherwords,we contract
￿
by
￿
and evaluatetheconditional
￿
￿
￿
withrespect tothiscontracted
belief state:
(PF)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Thus, when we hypotheticallysuspendbelief in
￿
, if
￿ is sufﬁcient torestore thisbelief then
￿ counts
as a valid explanation. The contracted belief set
￿
￿
￿ might fruitfully be thought of as the belief set
held by the agent before it came to accept the observation
￿
.
An (apparently) unfortunateconsequence of thisconditionisthe difﬁculty itintroducesin evalua-
tion. It seems to require that one generate a new epistemic state, reﬂecting the hypothetical belief set
￿
￿
￿ , against which to evaluate the conditional
￿
￿
￿
. Thus, (PF) requires two successive changes
in belief state, a contraction followed by a revision.7 However, it turns out that the condition (ES)
7This is especially problematic, for the AGM theory provides no guidance as to the conditionals an agent should adoptTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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ensures that one can effectively test (PF) without resorting to hypothetical contraction. We ﬁrst note
that (PF) reduces to (P) for hypothetical explanations; for if
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. For factual
explanations, (ES) requires that both
￿ and
￿
are believed. The following proposition shows that
(PF) can be evaluated without iterated belief change.
Proposition 3.1 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Thus condition (PF), in the presense of (ES), is equivalent to the following condition pertaining to
the absence of the observation:
(A)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
which is expressed in the object language as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . This captures the intuition that If the
observation had been absent, so too would be the explanation.
This conditionis now vacuous when the observation is rejected in
￿
, for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and we must
have
￿
￿
￿
￿
by (ES). It seems plausible to insist that an agent ought to imagine the explanation to
be possible and then test if rejection of the observation leads to rejection of the explanation; in other
words:
(AR)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
However, just as (PF) reduces to (A), so too does (AR) reduce to (P).
Proposition 3.2 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Thus, we are lead to the notion of a predictive explanation, relative to some epistemic state.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let
￿
be a
￿
-revision model reﬂecting the epistemic state of an agent with belief set
￿
. A predictive explanation for observation
￿
(relative to
￿
) is any
￿
￿
￿ CPL such that:
(ES)
￿
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
￿ ;
(P)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
; and
(A)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
in this contracted belief state. Very little can be known about the content of belief sets that are changed more than once as
required by (PF). TheAGM theory doesnot provide a method for determining the structure of the resulting epistemic state,
even if the original epistemic state and belief set
￿
are completely known(but for a recently developedmodel that captures
such iterated revision, see [6]).To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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   More
Plausible
RSW
RSW
RSW
Hypothetical Factual
RSWC
RSWC
RSWC
RSWC
RSWC
Figure 2: Explanations for “Wet Grass”
The reductionsafforded byPropositions3.1and3.2 are crucial, fortheyallowan agenttotestwhether
an explanation is valid relative to itscurrent epistemic state (or its current set of simpleconditionals).
An agent is not required to perform hypothetical contraction.
This deﬁnitioncaptures both factual and hypotheticalpredictive explanations. Furthermore, once
the epistemic status of
￿
is known we need only test one of the conditions (A) or (P).
Proposition 3.3 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿ (predictively) explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proposition 3.4 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿ (predictively) explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proposition 3.5 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿ (predictively) explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
.
Example 3.1 Figure 2 illustrates both factual and hypothetical explanations. In the ﬁrst model, the
agentbelievesthefollowingareeachfalse: thegrassiswet(
￿ ), thesprinklerison(
￿ ),itrained
(
￿
) and the grass is covered (
￿ ).
￿ is explained by sprinkler
￿ , since
￿
￿
￿ holds in that
model. So should the agent observe
￿ ,
￿ is as possible explanation; should the agent desire
￿ to be true (and have control over
￿ ) it can ensure
￿ by causing
￿ to hold. Similarly,
￿
explains
￿ , asdoes
￿
￿
￿
. Thus,there maybecompetingexplanations;we discusspreferencesTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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on these below. Intuitively,
￿ explains
￿
just when
￿
is true at the most plausible situations
in which
￿ holds. Thus, explanations are defeasible:
￿ is explained by
￿
; but,
￿
together
with
￿ does not explain wet grass, for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Notice that
￿
alone explains
￿ , since
the “exceptional” condition
￿ is normally false when
￿
holds, thus need not be stated. This
defeasibilityis a feature of explanationsthat has been given littleattentionin manylogic-based
approaches to abduction.
The second model illustrates factual explanations for
￿ . Since
￿ is believed, explanations
must also be believed.
￿
and
￿
￿ are candidates, but only
￿
satisﬁes the condition on factual
explanations: if we give up belief in
￿ , adding
￿
is sufﬁcient to get it back. In other words,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. This does not hold for
￿
￿ because
￿
￿
￿
￿ is false.
￿
The crucial features of predictive explanations illustrated in this example are their defeasibility, the
potential for competing explanations, and the distinction between factual and hypothetical explana-
tions.
Notice that if we relax the condition (ES) in the factual example above, we might accept
￿ as a
hypothetical explanation for factual belief
￿ . Although, we believe
￿
,
￿ and
￿
￿ , one might say
that “Had the sprinklerbeen on, the grass (still)wouldhave been wet.” Thisslightlymore permissive
form of predictive explanation, called counterfactual explanation, is not explored further here (but
see [10] for further details).
3.1.1 Causal Explanations
The notion of explanation described here cannot be given a truly causal interpretation. In the factual
model in Figure 2, we suggested that rain explains wet grass. However, it is also the case that wet
grass explains rain. Explanations are simply beliefs (whether factual or hypothetical) that induce
belief in the fact to be explained. The connection may be causal (belief in
￿
induces belief in
￿ ) or
evidential (belief in
￿ induces belief in
￿
).
Ultimately, we would like to be able to distinguish causal from non-causal explanations in this
conditional model. Lewis [37] has proposed a counterfactual analysis of causation, whereby a theory
of conditionals might be used to determine causal relations between propositions. More recently,
and perhaps more compelling, is the use of stratiﬁed rankings on conditionaltheories by Goldszmidt
and Pearl [27] to represent causation. Incorporating such considerations in our model brings to mind
Shoham’s [55] epistemic account of causality, whereby a causal theory is expressed in terms of the
knowledge of an agent, and can be nonmonotonic. Whether or not causality is an epistemic notion
(cf. the critique of Galton [20]), it is clear that perceived causal relations will have a dramatic impactTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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on the conditional beliefs of an agent. Furthermore, it is the epistemic state of an agent with respect
to which causal predictions and explanations must be derived. In this regard, an epistemic theory of
causal explanation is consistent with Shoham’s viewpoint. However, a more sophisticated account
of causation is necessary in order to distinguish causal from evidential relations among an agent’s
beliefs.8 A more suitable theory should include some account of actions, events, and “intervention”
[27]. For instance, if a (possibly hypothetical) mechanism exists for independently wetting the grass
(
￿ ) and makingit rain (
￿
), thiscan be exploitedto show that
￿ does not cause
￿
, but that
￿
causes
￿ , according to the plausibilityjudgements of an agent. Such experimentation or experience can be
used to distinguishcausal from evidential explanations.
Another similarity between conditionals and Shoham’s causal statements are their context-
sensitivity. Simon [56] argues that one potential drawback in Shoham’s theory is the necessity
of distinguishing causal from contextual conditions and the asymmetry this introduces. While this
may or may not be a necessary feature of “true” causal relations, it is a fact of life in any useful
epistemic account, for we naturally communicate and acquire our causal knowledge making such
distinctions. Simon ﬁnds disquieting the fact that the roles of cause and contextual condition are
sometimes reversed; but the dependence of the form of causal utterances on circumstances is exactly
what we capture when we evaluate causal statements with respect to an epistemic state. Imagine an
agent possesses two conditionals
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ : the grass gets wet when it rains unless
it’s covered. Taking
￿
￿ to be the normal case, it seems natural to offer
￿
as a causal explanation (or
cause) for
￿ , and take
￿
￿ to be a contextual condition. This offers a certain economy in thinking
about and communicating causes. However, in a different epistemic setting, without altering the
underlying physical causal relations (whatever they may be, or if they even exist), these roles may
reversed. If thegrassistypicallycovered, wemayhave
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Supposingthat
it usually rains,
￿
￿
￿
, an intuitive causal explanation for
￿ relative to this epistemic state is now
￿
￿ , someoneuncovered thegrass.
￿
isrelegatedtotheroleofcontextualcondition. Thisasymmetry,
far from being problematic, is natural and desirable. We do notdelve further intocausal explanations
here, but we conjecture that conditional logics will provide a natural and ﬂexible mechanism for
representing causal relations and generating causal explanations with an epistemic ﬂavor.
8Temporalprecedence,onemechanismavailablein Shoham’stheory,cannotresolvesuchissuesingeneral. Forinstance,
the truth of
￿
at time
￿ may be evidencefor the truth of fact
￿ at time
￿
￿
￿ 1 without having causedit.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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3.2 Nonpredictive Explanations
3.2.1 Might Explanations
Very often we are interested in weaker types of explanation that do not predict an observation, but
merely “allow” it. For example, suppose Fred has a choice of three supermarkets at which to shop,
one very close (
￿ ), and two rather farther away (
￿ and
￿ ). We expect Fred to shop at the closest
￿ , but observe that he actually chooses to shop at
￿ . We might explain Fred’s choice by claiming
that (
￿
) Fred dislikes the service at market
￿ . However, explanation
￿
does not predict that Fred
will choose
￿ , for he may well have chosen
￿ . That is, we do not accept the conditionals
￿
￿
￿ or
￿
￿
￿ , but only
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . In a sense
￿
“excuses” or permits
￿ but does not predict
￿ . If we
learned
￿
, we would claim that Fred might go to
￿ . Upon learning
￿ , we adopt the explanation
￿
.
A similar example is captured by the hypothetical model in Figure 2: here
￿ permits both
￿
and
￿
without predicting them. Might explanationsof this type play an importantrole in consistency-based
diagnosis without fault models as well (see Section 5).
Intuitively,amightexplanationreﬂectsthesloganIftheexplanationwerebelieved,theobservation
would be a possibility. The sense of “possible” here is naturally that of epistemic possibility. If an
agent accepts explanation
￿ , the observation
￿
becomes consistent with its new belief set. The might
condition is simply
(M)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
which is expressed as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
For hypothetical explanations of rejected
￿
(where
￿
￿
￿
￿
), mightexplanations require nothing
further. However, for explanations of indeterminate
￿
, we must weaken the condition (ES). If
￿
is
indeterminate, it is already a possibility for the agent, and we should not rule out beliefs
￿
￿
￿
as potential might explanations: if
￿ is believed (it is!) then
￿
is possible (it is!). Such might
explanations are not very informative, however, so we take the principle case for might explanations
to be that where
￿
is rejected. Thus, (ES) is again replaced by (F):9
(F) If
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
￿
￿
.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let
￿
be a
￿
-revision model reﬂecting the epistemic state of an agent with belief set
￿
. A might explanation for observation
￿
(relative to
￿
) is any
￿
￿
￿
￿ CPL such that:
(F)
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
B
￿ ; and
9This weakeningof (ES) does not affect the principle casewhere
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ cannot hold. So
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
ensures
￿
￿
￿
￿
for all might explanations.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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(M)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Intuitively,theepistemicstateinducedbyacceptance of
￿ mustcontain
￿
-worlds,hencerendering
￿
possible. If it contains only
￿
-worlds then
￿ is a predictive explanation. Predictive explanations
are therefore a special (stronger) case of might explanations.
Proposition 3.6 If
￿ is a predictive explanation for
￿
then
￿ is a might explanation for
￿
.
We take might explanations to be the primary form of non-predictive explanation.
3.2.2 A Variant of Might Explanations
InthissectionwedescribeaformofmightexplanationthatisofparticularrelevancetoCT4O-models,
where clusters of equally plausibleworlds are partiallyordered rather than totallyordered. This form
of explanation is somewhat difﬁcult to motivate independently, but in Section 4 we will see that it is
precisely the type of explanation used by Theorist.
Clearly, asentence
￿ can bea mightexplanationforboth
￿
and
￿
￿
. Thisissimilartothebehavior
of the weak conditional connective
￿ , where
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
can be held consistently. Recall
that a sentence
￿
￿
￿
holds just when
￿
holds at all worlds in some element of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , (i.e., at
minimalcluster of
￿ -worlds). We call
￿ a weak explanationfor
￿
justincase itisa mightexplanation
such that
￿
￿
￿
.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let
￿
be a
￿
-revision model reﬂecting the epistemic state of an agent with belief set
￿
. A weak explanation for observation
￿
(relative to
￿
) is any
￿
￿
￿ CPL such that:
(F)
￿
￿
￿ B
￿
￿
B
￿ ; and
(W)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Intuitively, weak explanations lie between predictive and mightexplanations. They are stronger than
might explanations, for they require, at some cluster of most plausible
￿ -worlds, that
￿
holds. All
other most plausible
￿ -worlds are of incomparable plausibility, so in some sense
￿ is “potentially
predictive” (it “could” be that the relevant cluster is actually min
￿
￿
￿
￿ , if only one could render all
worlds comparable). On the other hand, weak explanations are weaker than predictive explanations
in the sense that certain min
￿
￿
￿ -worlds do not (in the principle case) satisfy the observation. Weak
explanations are therefore a special (stronger) case of might explanations.
Proposition 3.7 If
￿ is a weak explanation for
￿
then
￿ is a might explanation for
￿
.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Naturally, inthelogicCO,since
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
, weakexplanationsarepredictive. Therefore, weak
explanations will only be used in the context of CT4O-models. In the CT4O-model in Figure 1(a),
￿
is a weak explanation for both
￿ and
￿
￿ .
3.3 Preferences
The explanations deﬁned above carry the explanatory force we expect, whether predictive or not,
yet are more ﬂexible than deductive explanations. They exhibit the desired defeasibility, allowing
exceptions and more speciﬁc information to override their explanatory status. However, the criteria
we propose admit many explanations for a given observation in general: any
￿ sufﬁcient to induce
belief in
￿
counts as a valid predictive explanation. For instance, rain explains wet grass; but a
tanker truck full of milk explodingin front of the yard also explains wet grass. If you could convince
someone that such an event occurred, you would convince them that the grass was wet.
Certainlysomeexplanationsshouldbepreferred toothersongroundsoflikelihoodorplausibility.
Inprobabilisticapproachestoabduction,onemightprefermostprobableexplanations. Inconsistency-
based diagnosis, explanations with the fewest abnormalities are preferred on the grounds that (say)
multiplecomponentfailures are unlikely. Such preferences can be captured in our modelquite easily.
Our CT4O- and CO-structures rank worlds according to their degree of plausibility, and reasonable
explanations are simply those that occur at the most plausible worlds. We recall from Section 2.2
the notion of plausibility as applied to propositions.
￿ is at least as plausible as
￿ just when, for
every
￿ -world
￿
, there issome
￿ -world thatis at least as plausibleas
￿
. For CO-models, thistotally
orders propositions; but for CT4O-models, two propositions may have incomparable “degrees” of
plausibility.
An adopted explanation is not one that simply makes an observation less surprising, but one that
is itself as unsurprisingas possible. We use the plausibilityranking to judge this degree of surprise.
Deﬁnition 3.4 If
￿ and
￿
￿
both explain
￿
then
￿ is at least as preferred as
￿
￿
(written
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
) iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . The preferred explanations of
￿
are those
￿ such that for no explanation
￿
￿
is it the case that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Preferred explanations are those that are most plausible, that require the “least” change in belief
set
￿
in order to be accepted. Examining the hypothetical model in Figure 2, we see that
￿
,
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ each explain
￿ ; but
￿
and
￿ are preferred to
￿
￿
￿ (itmaynotbe knownwhetherthe sprinkler
was onor itrained, butit’sunlikelythat thesprinklerwas oninthe rain). Anyworld inwhicha tanker
truck explodes is less plausible than these other worlds, so that explanation is given relatively less
credibility.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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By basing the notion of preference on the relative plausibilityof explanations, we lose the ability
to distinguishfactual explanations from one another. The conditions(ES) and (FS) ensure that every
valid explanation of a factual observation is believed, and all beliefs are equally (and maximally)
plausible for an agent. Thus, each candidate explanation is preferred. This ﬁts well with the point
of view adopted above: an agent, when accepting
￿
, also accepts its most plausible explanation(s).
There is no need, then, to rank factual explanations according to plausibility – all explanations in
￿
are equally plausible. If one wanted to distinguish possible explanations of some belief
￿
, one
mightdistinguishthehypotheticalexplanationsof
￿
inthecontracted belief state
￿
￿
￿ . Mostplausible
explanations are then those that the agent judged to be most plausible before accepting
￿
. However,
such a move serves no purpose, for the mostpreferred explanationsin state
￿
￿
￿ mustbe beliefs in
￿
.
Proposition 3.8 Let
￿
￿
￿
and
￿ be a predictive explanation for
￿
. Then
￿ is a preferred (hypo-
thetical) explanation for
￿
in
￿
￿
￿ .
Itisnothardtoseethatpreferencescannotbeappliedtohypotheticalexplanationsofindeterminate
￿
for precisely the same reason: all valid explanations must be epistemically possible, and therefore
maximally plausible, this because (ES) requires
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. For these reasons, when describing
preferences, we restrict our attention to hypothetical explanations of rejected
￿
.
A predictive explanation needn’t be compared to all other explanations in order to determine if it
is most preferred. The following proposition indicates a simpler test for preference.
Proposition 3.9 Let
￿ be a predictive explanation for
￿
relative to model
￿
. Then
￿ is a preferred
explanation iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
This test simply says that in any cluster of most normal
￿
-worlds, if
￿ is a preferred explanation of
￿
, then an
￿ -world must occur somewhere in that cluster, for this is (potentially) the most plausible
cluster of situations in which the observation holds.
The test is greatly simpliﬁed, and much clearer, for totally-ordered CO-models. This due to the
equivalence of
￿ and
￿ under CO.
Proposition 3.10 Let
￿ be a predictive explanation for
￿
relative to CO-model
￿
. Then
￿ is a
preferred explanation iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
In thiscase,
￿ isapreferred explanationiffbeliefin
￿
doesnotprecludethepossibilityof
￿ . Preferred
explanations are those that are most plausible, that require the “least” change in belief set
￿
in order
to be accepted. Examining the hypothetical model in Figure 2, we see that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
holds, but
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is false. So
￿
and
￿ are preferred explanations, while explanation
￿
￿
￿To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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is not.10
3.4 The Pragmatics of Explanation
In any actual system for explanation, ultimately a sentence must be returned which explains the
given observation. The semantic conditionswe have proposed admit explanations that are intuitively
unsatisfying in some circumstances. Of the many explanations, some may be preferred on grounds
other than plausibility. Natural criteria such as simplicity and informativeness are often used to rule
out certain explanations in certain contexts [47]. Levesque [35] has proposed criteria for judging the
simplicityofexplanations. Hobbset al[30]argue thatinnaturallanguage interpretationmostspeciﬁc
explanations are often required, rather than simple explanations. In diagnostic systems, often this
problem is circumvented, for explanations are usually drawn from a prespeciﬁed set of conjectures
[44] (see Sections 4 and 5).
Itisclear thattheexact forman explanationshouldtake isinﬂuencedbythe applicationonehasin
mind. Therefore, we donotincludesuchconsiderationsinoursemanticaccountofabduction. Rather,
we viewtheseaspragmaticconcerns, distinctfromthesemanticissuesinvolvedinpredictivenessand
plausibility (cf. Levesque [35]). Providing an account of the pragmatics of explanations is beyond
the scope of this paper; but we brieﬂy review two such issues that arise in our framework: trivial
explanations and irrelevant information.
3.4.1 Trivial Explanations
A simple theorem of CT4O and CO is
￿
￿
￿
. This means that
￿
is always a predictive (and
preferred) explanation for itself. While this trivial explanation may seem strange, upon reﬂection it
is clear that no other proposition has a stronger claim on inducing belief in an observation than the
observation itself. This makes the task of explanation quite simple! Unfortunately, a system that
provides uninformative trivial explanations will not be deemed especially helpful.
We expect pragmatic considerations, muchlike Gricean maxims, torule outuninformativeexpla-
nations where possible. For instance, one might require that an explanation be semantically distinct
from the observation it purports to explain. However, the semantics should not rule out trivial ex-
planations. In some applications a trivial explanation may be entirely appropriate. Consider causal
explanationsinacausalnetwork. Onemightexpectacausalexplanationforanodehavingaparticular
value to consist of some assignment of values to its ancestors. However, when asked to explain a
10When there are severaldisjoint preferred explanations(e.g.,
￿
,
￿ ), we may be interested in coveringexplanations,that
capture all of the plausible causesof an observation. We refer to [10] for a discussionof this notion.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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root node, no explanation but the trivial explanation seems appropriate. Presumably, in any abstract
model of a domain, causes (hence causal explanations) cannot be traced back ad inﬁnitum.11
3.4.2 Irrelevant Information
Very oftenonecan strengthenor weakenan explanationwithextraneousinformationandnotaffect its
explanatorypower. Butsuchconstructionsoftenresultinexplanationsthatareintuitivelyunsatisfying.
Suppose as usual that the sprinkler being on explains wet grass, so
￿
￿
￿ . Suppose furthermore
that the conditionals
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
are both rejected by the agent, where
￿
stands for “Fred’s
ofﬁce doorisopen,” somethingaboutwhichouragenthasnoinformation. Asimpleinference ensures
that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ both hold. Thus,
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
both explain
￿ . Yet,
intuitively both of these explanations are unappealing — they contain information that is irrelevant
to the conclusion at hand.
In ordertorule outsuchexplanations,we expectthe pragmaticcomponentof anabductivesystem
to ﬁlter out semantically correct explanations that are inappropriate in a given context. In Poole’s
Theorist system, for example, explanations are drawn from a prespeciﬁed set of conjectures. We can
view this as a crude pragmatic “theory.” Levesque [35] embeds a syntactic notion of simplicity in
his semantics for abduction. In our conditional framework one can deﬁne conditions under which a
proposition is deemed irrelevant to a conditional [21, 3].
Explanations can also be strengthened with “background information” that, while not irrelevant,
can be left unstated. For instance, returning to the example given by the factual model in Figure 2,
we can see that
￿
explains
￿ , and
￿
￿
￿
￿ explains
￿ as well. However, since
￿
￿ normally holds
when
￿
holds (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿ ), it can be left as a tacit assumption. Certainly,
￿
￿ is relevant, for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , but it needn’t be stated as part of the explanation. This suggests that logically weak
explanations are to be (pragmatically) preferred. It also suggestsa mechanism whereby an abductive
system can elaborate or clarify its explanations. Should an explanationbe questioned, the system can
identify tacit knowledge that is deemed relevant to the explanation and elaborate by providing these
facts.
One can weaken explanations by disjoining certain information to valid explanations, retaining
explanatory power. In general, if
￿ explains
￿ , and
￿ is less plausible that
￿ , then
￿
￿
￿ explains
￿ as well. Since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (because
￿ is less plausible than
￿ ), we must have
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
If rain explains wet grass, so does “It rained or the lawn was covered,” since
￿ is less plausible than
￿
. Once again, we view the weaker explanation as violating (something like) the Gricean maxim of
11“Why is the grass wet?” “Becauseit rained.” “Why did it rain?” “It just did!”To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Informativeness: the explanation
￿
is certainly more informative that the weaker
￿
￿
￿ (but still
relevant). The explanation
￿
￿
￿ also carries with it the unwanted implicature that both disjuncts
are (individually) valid explanations. This is strongly related to the following issue that arises in the
study of conditional logics: sentences with the linguistic form
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are usually intended to
represent an assertion with the logical form
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ [40].
4 Abductive Models of Diagnosis
One of the main approaches to model-based diagnostic reasoning and explanation are the so-called
“abductive” theories. Representative of these models is Poole’s [43, 44] Theorist framework for
explanation and prediction, and Brewka’s [12] extension of it. In this section, we describe both
models, how they can be embedded within our framework, and how the notions we deﬁned in the
last sectioncan be used to deﬁne natural extensionsof the Theorist framework. This also provides an
object-level semantic account of Theorist.
4.1 Theorist and Preferred Subtheories
Poole [43, 44] presents a framework for hypothetical reasoning that supports explanation and default
prediction. Theorist isbased on defaulttheories, pairs
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿
and
￿ are sets of sentences.12
The elements of
￿
are facts, known to be true of the situation under investigation. We take
￿ to
be a set of defaults, sentences that are normally true, or expectations about typical states of affairs.
Although nothing crucial depends on this, we assume
￿ to be consistent. Poole also uses a set
￿
of
conjectures that may be used in the explanation of observations, but should not be used in default
prediction.13
Deﬁnition 4.1 [44] An extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is any set Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿
is a maximal subset of
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
is consistent.
Intuitively, extensions are formed by assuming as many defaults as possible. Since defaults are
expected to be true, each extension corresponds to a “most normal” situation at which
￿
holds. A
12Poole’s presentation is ﬁrst-order, using ground instances of formulae in the deﬁnitions to follow. For simplicity, we
present only the propositional version.
13The following deﬁnitions are slightly modiﬁed, but capture the essential spirit of Theorist. We ignore two aspects
of Theorist, constraints and names. While constraints can be used to rule out undesirable extensions for prediction, it
is generally accepted that priorities, which we examine below, provide a more understandable mechanism for resolving
conﬂicts. The role of constraints in explanation has largely been ignored. Named defaults add no expressive power to
Theorist; they can be captured by introducing the names themselves as the only (atomic) defaults.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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(skeptical) notion of default prediction is deﬁned by considering what is true at each such normal
situation.
Deﬁnition 4.2 [44] Sentence
￿ is predicted by
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿ is in each extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Conjectures play a key role in abduction, and can be viewed as possiblehypothesesthat (together
with certain defaults) explain a given observation
￿
.
Deﬁnition 4.3 [44]
￿
￿
￿
is a (Theorist) explanationfor observation
￿
(w.r.t.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ )iff
￿
￿
￿
,
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
is consistent and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Since we take defaults to be assumptions pertaining to the normal course of events, the set
￿ of
adopted conjectures carries the bulk of the explanatory force of a Theorist explanation. Just as we
ignore “causal rules” and “scientiﬁc laws” in our earlier deﬁnition of predictive explanation, here we
take the default component of an explanation to be “understood,” and take a set
￿ of conjectures to
be a Theorist explanation iff there is some set of defaults
￿
that satisﬁes the required relation. We
assume sets
￿ ,
￿
and
￿
are ﬁnite and sometimes treat them as the conjunction of their elements.
Example 4.1 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
where
￿
,
￿ ,
￿
,
￿
and
￿ standfor universitystudent,adult, employed, Republicanand Paciﬁst,
respectively. The extensions of this default theory are
Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Thus
￿ is predicted, but neither
￿
nor
￿
￿
are predicted.
Suppose now that
￿
￿
￿
￿ . The conjecture
￿ explains
￿
, but does not explain
￿
￿
. Thus, if
one adopted belief in
￿ , one would predict
￿
. In a similar fashion,
￿
explains
￿
; but
￿
also
explains
￿
￿
. Notice that
￿
￿ is not explainable.
￿
The lastexplanationinthisexampleillustratesthat Theoristexplanationsare, ina certain sense, para-
consistent: a conjecture may explainbotha propositionand itsnegation. Certainly, suchexplanations
cannot be construed as predictive. Notice also that certain propositionsmay not have explanations of
the type deﬁned by Theorist, but can be explained (nontrivially) if we allow explanations that do not
lie within the set of conjectures. Intuitively, we might want to admit
￿
as a valid explanation of
￿
￿
even though it is not listed among our assumable hypotheses in
￿
.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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In the example above, the second extension is more satisfying than the ﬁrst. The fact that
university students are a speciﬁc subclass of adults suggests that the default rule
￿
￿
￿
￿
should be
applied instead of
￿
￿
￿
. Brewka [12] has extended the Theorist framework for default prediction
by introducing priorities on defaults to handle such a situation.
Deﬁnition 4.4 A Brewka theory is a pair
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿
is a set of facts and each
￿
￿
￿ is
a set of defaults.
Intuitively,
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is an ordered set of default sets, where the defaults in the lower ranked
sets have higher priority than those in the higher ranked sets. We will say that default
￿
￿
￿
￿ has
priority over default
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿
￿ . When constructing extensions of such a theory, if two default
rules conﬂict, the higher priority rule must be used rather than the lower priority rule. Multiple
extensions of a theory exist only when default rules of the same priority conﬂict with the facts or
higherpriorityrules. ATheoristdefaulttheory(withnoconjectures)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ isaBrewka theorywitha
single prioritylevel. The reductionof a Brewka theory toa (Theorist) default theoryis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,where
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Brewka’s preferred subtheories(hereafter dubbed extensions) are constructedin
the obvious way.
Deﬁnition 4.5 An extension of a Brewka theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is any set
￿
￿ Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where, forall1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
,
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
isa maximalconsistentsubsetof
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Thus, extensions are constructed by adding to
￿
as many defaults from
￿ 1 as possible, then as many
defaults from
￿ 2 as possible, and so on. The following proposition should be clear:
Proposition 4.1 Every extension of a Brewka theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a Theorist extension of its
reduction
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
PredictionbasedonaBrewkatheoryisdeﬁnedintheobviousway,asmembershipinallextensions.
It then becomes clear that:
Proposition 4.2
￿ ispredictedbyaBrewkatheory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ifitispredictedbyitsreduction
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Inotherwords,Brewka theoriesallow(typicallystrictly)morepredictionsthantheirTheoristcounter-
parts. In the example above, should we divide
￿ into priority levels by placing
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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in
￿ 1 and
￿
￿
￿
in
￿ 2, we are left with a single extension Cn
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , and
￿
￿
is predicted.
Brewka does not provide a notion of explanation, but the Theorist deﬁnition of explanation will
sufﬁce. That is,
￿ explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
is consistent with some set of defaults
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Again, we will often draw explanations from a prespeciﬁed set of
conjectures. This deﬁnition retains the essential properties of the Theorist deﬁnition, in particular, its
paraconsistent ﬂavor.
4.2 CapturingTheorist in CT4O
Our goal is to represent and extend the notion of explanation in Theorist by embedding it within
our conditional framework. This will have the effect of providing a semantic interpretation in our
conditional logic for Theorist’s notion of explanation and prediction. In what follows, we assume a
ﬁxed, consistent set of defaults
￿ , but the sets
￿
and
￿
of facts and conjectures, respectively, will be
allowed to vary.14
The deﬁnitions of extension and prediction in Theorist suggest that the more defaults a situation
satisﬁes, the more normal that situation is. We capture the normality criterion implicit in Theorist by
ranking possible worlds according to the default sentences they falsify (or violate).
Deﬁnition 4.6 For any possible world
￿
￿
￿ , the set of defaults violated by
￿
is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
If we interpret defaults as normality assumptions, clearly the ordering of worlds should be induced
by set inclusion on these violation sets. This gives rise to a suitable CT4O*-model, the Theorist
structure, for a set of defaults
￿ .
Deﬁnition 4.7 The Theorist structure for
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿ is the set of truth assign-
mentssuitablefor
￿ CPL;
￿ isthevaluationfunctioninducedby
￿ ;and
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proposition 4.3
￿
￿
￿
is a CT4O*-model.
The model
￿
￿
￿
divides worlds into clusters of equally plausible worlds that violate the same set of
defaults in
￿ . If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ then
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
. Otherwise,
￿ and
￿
must be in different
clusters.
14The consistency of the set
￿ is not crucial to our representation, but allows the presentation to be simpliﬁed. We
will point out various properties of our model that depend on this assumption and how they are generalized when
￿ is not
consistent.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Figure 3: Theorist Model for the University Students Example
Proposition 4.4
￿
is a cluster in the model
￿
￿
￿
iff for some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
if
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Since
￿ isﬁnite, anymodel
￿
￿
￿
consistsofa ﬁnitesetofclusters. Figure3depictstheTheoristmodel
for the default set
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . The bottom cluster contains those worlds that
violate no defaults, that is, the most normal worlds. The middle clusters (from left to right) violate
the default sets
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , respectively. The least plausible worlds violate
the default set
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Notice that the model
￿
￿
￿
is sensitive to the syntactic structure
of the default set
￿ . Logically equivalent sets of defaults can result in drastically different models,
reﬂecting the syntax-sensitivityexhibited by Theorist.
To interpret this model, we view the defaults in
￿ as expectations held by an agent, statements
regarding the most normal or plausible states of affairs. If an agent has no “factual beliefs,” it would
adopt this set of defaults as its only beliefs. Thus, the model
￿
￿
captures the epistemic state of an
agent who has yet to encounter any default violations. In a diagnosis application, we might think of
suchabeliefstateasrepresentingthenormalfunctioningofasystem. Noticethatsince
￿ isconsistentTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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the model
￿
￿
￿
has a unique minimalcluster.15
The facts
￿
play no role in the deﬁnition of the model
￿
￿
￿
. The manner in which we deﬁne
prediction and explanation relative to this model below will account for
￿
by using these facts in the
antecedents of relevant conditionals. This allows a single model to be used for a variety of different
sets of facts. One can explicitly account for
￿
in the model by ruling out any worlds falsifying
￿
(e.g., by using the axiom
￿
￿
￿
). However, we ﬁnd the current formulation more convenient.
4.2.1 Prediction
Extensionsofadefaulttheory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ areformedbyconsideringmaximalsubsetsofdefaultsconsistent
with the facts
￿
. Recall the deﬁnition of a most plausibleset of
￿ -worlds in a CT4O-model for some
proposition
￿ from Section 2:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
is a cluster
￿
By Proposition 4.4, the worlds in some most plausible set of
￿ -worlds must violate exactly the same
defaults. IntheTheoristmodel,anextensionmustthencorrespondtoasetofmostplausible
￿
-worlds.
Proposition 4.5
￿
is an extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Corollary 4.6
￿ is in some extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Theorist predictionsare those sentences true inall extensions. Since min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , we have the
following:
Theorem 4.7
￿ is predicted (in Theorist sense) from default theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Thus, default predictions in Theorist correspond precisely to those sentences an agent would believe
if it adopted belief in the facts
￿
. In other words, believing
￿
induces belief in all (and only) default
predictions.
Consider the example illustrated in Figure 3. We have
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
, corresponding
to the Theorist predictions
￿
and
￿
￿
when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Notice that
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
all hold, indicating that none of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
are predicted when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . But
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ holds so
￿
￿
￿ is predicted by Theorist when
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
15If
￿ is inconsistent, then we will have a minimal cluster corresponding to each maximal consistent subset of
￿ ; i.e., a
minimal cluster for each extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
4 ABDUCTIVE MODELS OF DIAGNOSIS 34
4.2.2 Weak Explanations
To capture Theorist explanations, we assume the existence of a set
￿
of conjectures from which
possible explanations are drawn. Recall that
￿
￿
￿
explains
￿
(in the Theorist sense) iff
￿ , together
with
￿
and some subset of defaults
￿
￿
￿ , entails
￿
. When this relation holds, there clearly must
exist a maximal such set of defaults consistent with
￿ . This allows us to restrict our attention to such
maximal subsets of
￿ . Essentially, we can exploit the result of Poole ensuring that
￿
is explainable
iff it is in some extension. The notion of weak explanation described in Section 3 precisely captures
Theorist explanations.
Theorem 4.8 Let
￿
￿
￿
. Then
￿ isa Theoristexplanationfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
is consistent.
In other words,
￿ is a Theorist explanation iff
￿
￿
￿ is a weak explanation.16
The defeasibility of Theorist explanations is captured by the weak conditional
￿ . In
￿
￿
above
we have that
￿
￿
￿
￿
, so
￿ explains
￿
￿
(indeed,
￿
￿
is explainable with
￿ ). However, adding the
fact
￿
￿
renders thisexplanation invalid, for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. The paraconsistent nature of Theorist
explanations corresponds precisely to the paraconsistent nature of the connective
￿ . In the example
above, we have
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
, so when
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
explainsboth
￿
and
￿
￿
. If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ then
￿
is predicted; but
￿
again explains
￿
￿
, as well as
￿
, for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
both hold.
4.2.3 Predictive Explanations
Some Theorist explanations do not exhibit this paraconsistent behavior. For instance, if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
explains
￿ since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . However, the even stronger relation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is true as
well. Thus, given fact
￿
, if
￿
is adopted as a belief
￿ becomes believed as well. The notion of
predictive explanationas described inSection 3 seems especially natural and important. With respect
to the Theorist model, we would expect a predictive Theorist explanation to be a set of conjectures
￿ satisfying the relation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. While no such concept has been deﬁned with the Theorist
framework, we can extend Theorist with this capability.
Using the original ingredientsof Theorist, a predictive explanation shouldbe such that all (rather
than some) extensions of the explanation (together with the given facts) contain the observation.
Deﬁnition 4.8 Let
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
be some observation.
￿ is a predictive explanation for
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
for all extensions
￿
of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
16Ifexplanationsneednotcomefromaprespeciﬁedpoolofconjectures
￿
, thenany
￿ suchthat
￿
￿
￿
￿
isaweakexplanation
will be considereda Theorist explanation.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Since prediction is based on considering the most normal situations consistent with some facts,
predictive explanations should be evaluated with respect to all most normal situations satisfying
that explanation. This deﬁnition reﬂects precisely the predictive explanations (in the CT4O sense)
sanctioned by the Theorist model
￿
￿
￿
.
Theorem 4.9 Let
￿
￿
￿
. Then
￿ is a predictive Theorist explanationfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿ is consistent.
Notice that while the normative aspect of predictive Theorist explanations is explicitly brought
out by Deﬁnition 4.8 (in particular, by the restriction to maximal subsets of defaults), it is implicit in
the formulation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
of Theorem 4.9. This is due to the fact that the Theorist model
￿
￿
is
constructedinsucha waythatmaximalsetsofdefaultsare “preferred,” andthefact that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
is evaluated only in these most preferred situationssatisfying
￿
￿
￿ .
In our example above,
￿ predictivelyexplains
￿
(with no facts) since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Naturally,
predictive explanations are defeasible:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
so
￿
￿
￿ fails to predictively explain
￿
.
If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ then
￿
predictively explains
￿ since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . The notion of predictive explanation
described for epistemic explanations suggests a very natural and useful extension of the Theorist
framework. Theorem 4.9 ensures that the predictive explanations deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.8 match
our intuitions, while the deﬁnition itself demonstrates how our predictive explanations can be added
directly to the Theorist framework.
4.2.4 Preferences
As with most approaches to abduction, Theorist admits a number of possible explanations, whether
weak or predictive, and makes no attempt to distinguish certain explanations as preferred to others.
Even if we restrict attention to explanations that are formed from elements of a conjecture set
￿
,
certain explanations seem more plausible than others. For example, one may have a set of defaults
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
inducing the Theorist model pictured in Figure 4: rain and the sprinkler cause wet grass, and the
sprinkler is on only if it isn’t raining. Assuming
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ , each of
￿
,
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
(predictively)explain
￿ . However, inspectionofthemodel
￿
￿
suggeststhat,infact, theexplanation
￿
￿
￿ should be less preferred than the others. This is due to the fact that the ordering of plausibility
on propositionsinduced by
￿
￿
￿
makes
￿
￿
￿ less plausible than
￿
or
￿ .
Theorist provides no notion of preference of this type; but our deﬁnition of preference from
Section 3 readily lends itself to application within the Theorist framework. In the parlance ofTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Figure 4: Theorist Model for the Wet Grass Example
Theorist, preferred explanations ought to be those that occur at the mostplausible situations, or those
that are consistent with as many defaults as possible. However, explanatory conjectures alone do not
have the predictive force required — the facts
￿
must also be considered.
Deﬁnition 4.9 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
be predictive Theorist explanations for
￿
, relative to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
￿ is
at least as preferred as
￿
￿
(written
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
) iff each maximal subset of defaults
￿
￿
￿
￿
consistent with
￿
￿
￿
￿
is contained in some subset of defaults
￿
￿
￿ consistent with
￿
￿
￿
.
Explanation
￿ is a preferred explanation iff there is no explanation for
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
In our example,
￿
and
￿ are equally preferred explanations since both are consistent with the entire
setofdefaults
￿ . Theexplanation
￿
￿
￿ islesspreferred becauseitconﬂictswiththedefault
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
It is possible, due to the fact that the plausibilityrelation determined by
￿
￿
is not total, that two
explanations are incomparable. If asked to explain
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , predictive explanations
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿ are preferred to the explanation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Yet these two preferred explanations are
incomparableintheTheoristmodel. Thisnotionofpreference correspondsnaturallytotheplausibility
ordering determined by
￿
￿
.
Theorem 4.10 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
be predictive Theorist explanations for
￿
, relative to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Notice that the comparison of plausibility can be applied to nonpredictive explanations as well. We
will see this in Section 5.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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4.3 CapturingPreferred Subtheories in CT4O
The manner in which Theorist is embedded in our abductive framework also applies to Brewka’s
preferred subtheories. For a Brewka theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ the plausibility of worlds is not
determined solely by the number of rules violated, but also the priority of those rules. Implicit in the
deﬁnition of an extension is the idea that any number of rules of lower priority may be violated if it
allows a rule of higher priority to be satisﬁed. This gives rise to a new deﬁnition of rule violation.
Deﬁnition 4.10 For any possible world
￿
￿
￿ , the set of defaults of rank
￿ violated by
￿
is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
A world that violates fewer high priority defaults than another world should be considered more
plausible, even if the second world violates fewer low prioritydefaults. Thisgives rise to the Brewka
structure for an ordered set of defaults
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Deﬁnition 4.11 Let
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ be an ordered set of defaults, and let
￿
￿
￿
be possible worlds. The
minimal rank at which
￿
and
￿ differ is
diff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
, by convention we let diff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1.
Thus, diff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ denotes the highest priority partition of default rules
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ within which
￿
and
￿ violate different rules. It is this set of rules that determines which of
￿
or
￿ is more plausible.
Deﬁnition 4.12 The Brewka structure for
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿ is the set of
truth assignments suitable for
￿ CPL;
￿ is the valuation function induced by
￿ ; and
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proposition 4.11
￿
￿
￿
is a CT4O*-model.
Let us denote by
￿ the set
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . The model
￿
￿
￿
, just as the Theorist model
￿
￿
￿
, divides
worlds into clusters of equally plausible worlds that violate exactly the same set of defaults in
￿ .
Proposition 4.12
￿
is a cluster in the model
￿
￿
￿
iff for some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
if
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Figure 5: Brewka Model for the University Students Example
However, the ordering of clusters is determined differently. In the Theorist model, only set inclusion
is used to determine relative plausibility. In contrast, the Brewka model may rank a world
￿ more
plausible than a world
￿
, even if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . In particular, we may have that
￿ violates a
low priority rule that is satisﬁed by
￿
. Figure 5 depicts the Brewka model for the default sets
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿ 2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . In contrast with the Theorist model for the “ﬂat”
version of this theory (see Figure 3), we see that worlds violating the rule
￿
￿
￿
are more plausible
than worlds violating either of the other two rules (individually).
The notions of prediction and explanation in Brewka’s framework correspond to our conditional
modelsofpredictionandexplanation,allowingresultstobeshownthatare entirelyanalogoustothose
demonstrated above for Theorist. We omit proofs of the following results; they can be veriﬁed in a
straightforwardwaybyextendingtheproofsofthecorrespondingresultsforTheoristtoaccommodate
the more reﬁned ordering of clusters provided in Deﬁnition 4.12.
Proposition 4.13
￿
is an extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ in the
model
￿
￿
.
Corollary 4.14
￿ is in some extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Theorem 4.15
￿ is predicted from Brewka theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Assuming some set of conjectures
￿
, we have
Theorem 4.16 Let
￿
￿
￿
. Then
￿ is a Theorist explanation for
￿
relative to the Brewka theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿ is consistent.
We deﬁne predictive explanations for a Brewka theory in the same fashion as for Theorist.
Deﬁnition 4.13 Let
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
be someobservation.
￿ is a predictive explanationfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
for all extensions
￿
of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Intuitively, an observation is predictively explained by some conjectures if, for every “maximal” set
of defaults consistentwith
￿ and
￿
, the observation is entailed by the facts
￿
and the conjectures
￿ ,
together with these defaults. However, Brewka explanationsrely on a deﬁnitionof “maximality”that
includes the consideration of priority of default rules.
Theorem 4.17 Let
￿
￿
￿
. Then
￿ is a predictive Brewka explanationfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿ is consistent.
Finally, preferences on explanations are also deﬁned in the same manner, but again taking priorities
into account.
Deﬁnition 4.14 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
bepredictiveBrewka explanationsfor
￿
, relativetotheBrewkatheory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . We call the set
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
a maximal set of defaults for
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
is a maximal consistent subset of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, for each 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿ is atleastas preferred as
￿
￿
(written
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
iff for each maximal set of defaults
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
there is a maximal set
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
for each 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Theorem 4.18 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
be predictive Brewka explanationsfor
￿
, relative to the Brewka theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
If we compare the Brewka model
￿
￿
in Figure 5 with the Theorist model for the same (unpri-
oritized) set of defaults
￿
￿
￿
in Figure 3, the differences in structure induced by priorities become
clear. In a sense, the Brewka model has increased “connectivity”. While worlds that are comparableTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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in the Theorist model remains so in
￿
￿
￿
, certain clusters of worlds that are incomparable become
comparable in
￿
￿
￿
. This leads, for instance, to the fact that
￿
predicts
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
, but does not in
￿
￿
. This increased connectivity is, in fact, necessarily the case.
Proposition 4.19 Let
￿
￿
be the Brewka model for
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
the Theorist model for its
reduction
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
￿
whenever
￿
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
￿
.
Theorem 4.20 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Thus any predictive explanation in Theorist is also a predictive explanationwhen any set of priorities
is introduced.
Intuitively, one would expect priorities to prune away possible explanations. For predictive
explanations, the opposite may occur, since priorities can only increase the number of predictions
admitted by a set of facts and conjectures. However, if we consider only preferred predictive
explanations, we have more reasonable behavior. It becomes clear that priorities may, in fact, reduce
the number of preferred explanations (and it cannot increase the number).
We notethatthe representationof TheoristandBrewka modelsfor a givensetof defaultsdoes not
require thatonespecifytheorderingrelationforthemodelexplicitlyforeach pairofworlds. Onemay
axiomatizethemodel(relatively)conciselyusingtechniquesdescribedin[3]. Thetruthofconditionals
determining explanations and preferences can then be tested against this theory. However, we are
not suggesting that our conditional framework be used as a computational basis for explanations in
simple Theorist-like theories. Rather, it brings to light the underlying semantic properties of Theorist
and several principled extensions.
5 Consistency-Based Diagnosis
While the Theorist system may be used for diagnosis (as our examples in this section illustrate), it is
presentedmoregenerallyasamethodforeffectingarbitraryexplanations. Anotherapproachtomodel-
based diagnosis is consistency-based diagnosis, which is aimed more directly at the diagnostic task,
namely todeterminewhya correctly designedsystemisnotfunctioningaccording toitsspeciﬁcation.
In thissection, after presentingthefundamentalconcepts fromReiter’s [49] and deKleer, Mackworth
and Reiter’s [16]methodologyfordiagnosis,weshowhowthesecanonical consistency-basedmodels
can be embedded in our framework for epistemic explanations. This highlights many of the key
similarities and differences in the abductive and consistency-based approaches. We also address the
role fault models play within our semantics and how diagnoses can be made predictive.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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5.1 A Logical Speciﬁcation
de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter [49, 16] assume that an appropriate model of a system or artifact
consists of two parts. The ﬁrst is a set of components COMP, the parts of a system that one is able
to distinguish and that (more or less) independently can fail to function correctly. The second is a
set of logical sentences SD, the system description, that describes precisely the intended or normal
functioningofthesystem. Forexample,givenacertainsetofinputstoacircuit,thesystemdescription
should allow one to predict the value of the outputs. Because certain components may fail, a system
description that only allows for correct behavior will be inconsistent with observations of incorrect
behavior. Therefore, abnormality predicates are introduced. For any component
￿
￿ COMP, the
literal ab
￿
￿
￿ denotes the fact that component
￿ is not functioning as required. Such a component is
said to be abnormal; otherwise it is normal. We assume that components usually function correctly.
However, because expected observations depend on this assumption, the system description will
usually contain sentences in which anticipated behavior is explicitly predicated on this assumption.
Thussentencessuchas
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ assertthat,ifcomponent
￿
￿ isfunctioningcorrectlythenbehavior
￿ will be observed. The correct functioning of a system is then more accurately characterized by the
set of sentences
CORRECT
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿ COMP
￿
Throughout we assume that this set CORRECT is consistent.
If an observation is obtained that is inconsistent with CORRECT then (assuming that both the
observation and system description are accurate and correct), it must be that some of the components
have failed; that is, ab
￿
￿
￿
￿ must hold for some members
￿
￿
￿ COMP.17 A diagnosis for such an
observation is any set of components whose abnormality (alone) makes the observation consistent
with SD. More precisely, following [16], we have these deﬁnitions.18
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let
￿
￿ COMP be a set of components. Deﬁne sentence
￿
￿
￿
￿ to be
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿ COMP
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ expresses the fact that the components in
￿
are functioningimproperly while all other compo-
nents are functioning correctly.
17We will make a few remarks at the conclusionof this section regarding the possibility that SD is an incorrect model.
18As usual, a “set” of observations will be assumed to be ﬁnite and conjoined into a single sentence
￿ . For any set of
sentences, such as SD, we will assume ﬁniteness, and treat the set somewhat loosely as the conjunction of its elements.
Context should make clear whether the sentenceor the set is intended.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Deﬁnition 5.2 Let
￿
￿ COMP . A consistency-based diagnosis(CB-diagnosis for short) for obser-
vation
￿
is any
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is satisﬁable.
Reiter’s [49] “Principle of Parsimony” suggests that reasonable diagnoses are those that require
as few faultsas possibletoexplaintheaberrant behavior. Aminimaldiagnosisisany diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿
such that for no proper subset
￿
￿
￿
￿
is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ a diagnosis. In Reiter’s original formulation, only
minimaldiagnosesare deemedessential. Ifthecorrect functioningofasystemisallthatismodeledin
SD, then one can show, for any diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿ , that a larger component set
￿
￿
￿
￿
also determines
a diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Thus, minimal diagnoses characterize the set of all diagnoses.
Example 5.1 Imagine a simple system with two components, a plug and a light bulb. One can
observe that the bulb is bright, dim or dark. SD captures the correct behavior of the system:
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
We assume thatthe three possibleobservationsare exhaustive and mutuallyexclusive(and that
this fact is captured in SD as well). We expect to see a bright light (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is true), since
this is entailed by CORRECT:
SD
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Ifweobserve
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,thentheminimaldiagnosesare
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Thenonminimal
diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ also renders the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿ consistent. Notice that each of
these diagnoses applies to the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ as well, even though this is the system’s
predicted behavior. That is, the diagnoses do not rule out the “correct” behavior.
￿
The presence of fault models renders Reiter’s characterization incorrect.19 de Kleer, Mackworth
and Reiter suggest a notion of kernel diagnosis that can be used to replace minimal diagnosis in the
characterization of all diagnoses. Our goal here is notto investigatesuch characterizations, but rather
investigatethe semanticsof diagnosisas explanation. Despitethe failure of minimaldiagnosesinthis
characterization task, the principle of parsimony (in the absence of more reﬁned, say, probabilistic
information)suggeststhatminimaldiagnosesare to bepreferred. We willsimplypointoutthe impact
of fault models on diagnosis.
Intuitively, a fault model is a portionof the system description that allows predictions to be made
when itisknownor assumedthatsomecomponentisfaulty. Intheexampleabove, onecannotpredict
19Similar remarks apply to exonerationaxioms, which we do not discusshere.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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anything about the brightness of the light if one of the components is abnormal. All observations are
possible (consistent). Suppose we add the following axiom:
ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
While
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are bothdiagnosesfor
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,the“larger” diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
isnot. Thus, inthepresenceoffaultmodels,supersetsofdiagnosesneednotthemselvesbediagnoses.
de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter do, however, formulate conditions under which this is guaranteed to
be the case.
5.2 CapturingConsistency-Based Models in CT4O
Just as with our embedding of Theorist, we can provide a CT4O-model that captures the underlying
intuitions of consistency-based diagnosis. We assume that the language in which the system de-
scription and observations are phrased is propositional, denoted
￿ CPL. We will assume that for each
component in COMP there is a proposition stating that the component has failed. We will, however,
continue to use the ﬁrst-order notation ab
￿
￿
￿ for such a proposition.20
The principle of parsimony carries with it the implicit assumption that situations in which fewer
system components are abnormal are more plausible than those with more components failing. This
suggests a natural ordering of plausibilityon possible worlds.
Deﬁnition 5.3 Let
￿
beapossibleworldsuitablefor
￿ CPL andCOMPsomesetofsystemcomponents.
The abnormalityset for
￿
is the set
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ COMP :
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
Deﬁnition 5.4 Theconsistency-basedmodel(theCB-model)forcomponentsetCOMPis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿ is theset oftruthassignmentssuitablefor
￿ CPL;
￿ isthevaluationfunction
induced by
￿ ; and
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proposition 5.1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CT4O*-model.
NoticethattheCB-modelfora setofcomponentsisexactlytheTheoristmodelwiththesetofdefaults
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿ COMP
￿
20A ﬁrst-order diagnosticmodelcanbecapturedpropositionallyby usinggroundterms shouldthe domainof components
andother objectsof interest beﬁnite. A ﬁrst-order versionof our logicscouldbeusedbutthis is not relevantto our concerns
here.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Dm
Ab(b) Ab(p) Drk
Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Dm
Ab(b) Ab(p) Drk
Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Dm
Ab(b) Ab(p) Drk
Figure 6: The CB-model for a Two Component System
We will exploit this fact below when comparing consistency-based and abductive diagnosis.
The model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ does not rule out worlds violatingSD. SD, much like
￿
above, will be used
explicitlyin deﬁning diagnoses. Worlds in which
￿ SD holdswillnot playa role in consistency-based
diagnosis; therefore, we could easily use a CT4O-model in which only SD-worlds are represented
(e.g., using the axiom
￿
￿ SD).21
Example 5.2 Figure 6 illustrates the model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for our simple light bulb example with two
components. For simplicity, we show only those worlds that satisfy the system description SD
provided in Example 5.1. As usual, worlds in the same cluster are those in which the same
components have failed or work correctly.
￿
The most plausible state of affairs in the model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is simply the set of worlds satisfying
the theory CORRECT. Should an observation be made that conﬂicts with this theory, the system
must be functioning abnormally and belief in the assumption
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ for at least one
￿
￿
￿ must be
retracted. A diagnosisisan explanation,givenintermsofnormaland abnormalcomponents,forsuch
anobservation. ClearlyaCB-diagnosisisnotpredictive,foritsimplymustensurethattheobservation
is rendered plausible. In Example 5.1, the sentences
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are both diagnoses
21However,onecould imagine the diagnosticprocessincludingthe debuggingof SD, astakesplacefor instancein model
veriﬁcation, or even scientiﬁc theory formation.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
5 CONSISTENCY-BASED DIAGNOSIS 45
of the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿ . But neither of these diagnoses entails the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿ . This leads to
the notion of an excuse, which is simplya might explanation, as described in Section 3, consistingof
possible component failures.
Deﬁnition 5.5 Let
￿
￿ COMP be a set of components. Deﬁne sentence
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ to be
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Thus,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ assertsthatallcomponentsin
￿
are functioningabnormally. Incontrasttothesentence
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ asserts nothing about the status of components not in
￿
.
Deﬁnition 5.6 Let COMP and SD describe some system. An excuse for an observation
￿
is any
sentence
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (where
￿
￿ COMP) such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
If belief in the excuse were adopted, the observation would not be disbelieved. For instance, the
model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ admits excuses
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Notice that
￿
￿
￿
￿ (which we assume to be
￿ ) is not an excuse for
￿
￿
￿
￿ since the belief
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
precludes it; that is, the conditional
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is false.
Because of the orderingof plausibilitybuiltinto theCB-model, when a certain setof components
is believed to have failed, other components are assumed to still be functioning correctly.
Proposition 5.2
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
This propositionensures that a diagnosisinthe CT4O framework (i.e., an excuse) can be given solely
in terms of failing components. Thus, we have that an excuse determines a CB-diagnosis for an
observation.
Theorem 5.3 Let SD and COMP determine some system.
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for observation
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is an excuse for
￿
relative to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Naturally,weshouldnotacceptanymightexplanationforanobservationasareasonablediagnosis.
Preferred diagnosesshouldbethosethataremostplausible,andtheorderingofplausibilitydetermined
by themodel
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ can be usedfor thispurpose. Unsurprisingly,preferred diagnosesare precisely
those that minimize the number of abnormal components.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Dm
Ab(b) Ab(p) Drk
Ab(b) Ab(p) Br
Ab(b) Ab(p) Dm
Ab(b) Ab(p) Drk
Ab(b) Ab(p) Drk
Figure 7: The Addition of a Fault Axiom
Deﬁnition 5.7 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ beCB-diagnosesforobservation
￿
.
￿
￿
￿
￿ isatleastaspreferred
as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (written
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is preferred diagnosis iff there is no diagnosis for
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Theorem 5.4
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a preferred diagnosisiff
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a minimal diagnosis.
5.3 Predictive Diagnoses and Fault Models
Consider the light bulb example above with the additional axiom
ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
incorporated into the system description SD. Figure 7 illustrates the model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for this new
systemSD
￿ . Thisadditionalaxiomwillbedubbeda faultaxiomora partialfaultmodel. If allaxioms
havea“positiveform”(i.e., describingbehaviorbasedonlyonconditionsofnormality),thendiagnoses
(or assumptions of abnormality) can never be used to predict aberrant behavior. In other words, all
“observations” are consistent with each (nonempty) diagnosis. Fault models change the nature of
diagnosisbymakingitamore“nonmonotonicprocess.” Forinstance,withoutthisfaultaxiom,thetwoTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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excuses
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ determinediagnosesfortheobservation
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,asdoesthelarger
diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . This forms the basis for Reiter’s [49] characterization of all diagnoses
in terms of minimaldiagnoses. However, with the fault axiom, the sentence
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is not
an excuse for
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
This reﬂects the observation of de Kleer, Mackworth and Reiter that supersets of diagnoses need not
be diagnoses themselves. In our terminology:
Proposition 5.5 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is an excuse for observation,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ need not be, where
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Fault models have another impact on the nature of diagnosis. Consider the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
One diagnosis for this observation (relative to SD
￿ ) is the excuse
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Withoutfaultaxioms(i.e.,usingSDratherthanSD
￿ ),suchanexcuserenderstheobservationplausible,
but does not preclude other observations. However, with the fault axiom we have an even stronger
predictive condition:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Not only does the diagnosis render
￿
￿
￿
￿
plausible, it also induces belief in the observation
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Naturally, onemightextendthedeﬁnitionof adiagnosisbyrequiringnotonlythattheobservation
be rendered consistent, but also that it be entailed by the diagnosis. Such diagnoses will be dubbed
predictive diagnoses.
Deﬁnition 5.8 Let
￿
￿ COMP . A predictive diagnosis for observation
￿
is any
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that
SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is consistent.
Theorem 5.6 Assume
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD is consistent.
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a predictive diagnosisfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
Predictive diagnosesare predictive explanationsrather than mightexplanations,and as suchcarry
many of the conceptual advantages of predictive explanations. Unfortunately, for most systems, one
cannot expect diagnoses to be predictive in most circumstances. Typically, the knowledge of how
a system fails is incomplete. One may know that a weak battery causes an LED display to show
“strange” readings, but the speciﬁc observed display in such a circumstance is not usually predictedTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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by a diagnosis. However, with partial fault models one will have that certain diagnoses predict the
observations they explain, rather than just excusing them.
If onehasacompletefaultmodelincorporatedintoSD, intuitivelyevery diagnosiscarries withita
predictionaboutthebehaviorthatcanbeobserved. Thus,onewouldexpectthateveryCB-diagnosis,in
the processofexcusingtheobservation, wouldactuallypredictit. Thisleads togeneralcircumstances
under which every CB-diagnosis of an observation for a particular system is a predictive diagnosis.
We assumethat the system’sbehavior can be characterized by a given set of possibleobservations
￿
,
the elements of which must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive (relative to SD).22 We say that SD
contains a complete model of correct behavior iff there exists a
￿
￿
￿
s.t.
CORRECT
￿
￿
￿
￿
where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
We say that SD contains a complete fault model iff for each diagnosis
￿
￿
￿
￿ there is a
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Noticethatacompletefaultmodel,onthisdeﬁnition,ensuresthatonehasacompletemodelofcorrect
behavior (simply set
￿
￿
￿ ). If required, we could restrict
￿
to nonempty sets of components, thus
decoupling the model of faulty behavior from that of correct behavior.
If SD contains a complete model of correct behavior and a complete fault model, it is easy to see
that each consistency-baseddiagnosiswillbe predictive. Considerour lightbulbexampleonce again,
with observable behaviors
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
and the following axioms in SD (the ﬁrst models
correct behavior, the second and third are fault axioms):
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
22One may expect a number of possible observations of correct behavior, for instance, corresponding to the possible
inputs to a circuit. However, we treat this as a single observation, the form of which will typically be a conjunction of
implications or biconditionals. The antecedents will determine certain inputs and the consequents certain outputs (e.g.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). Similar remarks apply to incorrect behavior. This is not the main point of our description so
we do not pursue this issue further.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Clearly, any excuse we can make for a given observation will also predict that observation. In this
example, every CB-diagnosis is a predictive diagnosis.
Proposition 5.7 If SD includes a complete fault model then
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
is a predictive diagnosisfor
￿
.
Notice thattodiagnosefaultybehavioronly, amodelofcorrect behaviorisnotrequired —a complete
fault model ensures that predictive explanations can be given for every “abnormal” observation.
However, withoutanyindicationofcorrectbehavioranyobservationisconsistentwiththeassumption
that all components work correctly. Thus, a complete model of correct behavior is required if CB-
diagnosesare tobe of anyuse. Thisisinaccordance withthe observationof Poole[45] whodescribes
the categories of information required for consistency-based diagnosis and abductive diagnosis.
Console and Torasso [13] have also addressed this issue. They suggest, as we have elaborated above,
thatconsistency-baseddiagnosisisappropriateiffaultmodelsarelacking,whileabductiveapproaches
are more suitable if models of correct behavior are incomplete.
It is important to notice that the deﬁnition of complete fault model above relies crucially on the
set of propositions one is allowed to explain, in other words, the set of “observables.” For example,
suppose we had only a single fault axiom:
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
This fault model is incomplete relative to the original set of observables, for no CB-diagnosis for
￿
￿
￿
￿ actually predicts
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Each diagnosis,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,allows the
possibility of observation
￿
￿
￿
￿
. However, suppose we “coalesce” the observations
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
into a single category
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. If the observations a system is allowed to explain
are restricted to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , this fault model is complete; any CB-diagnosis will then
predict its observation. In thisexample,
￿
￿
￿
￿ predicts
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,while the other three diagnosespredict
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . If users are allowed to make more reﬁned observations, predictive diagnoses can be
given if observations are mapped into coarse-grained explainable propositions.
5.4 On the Relationship to Abductive Diagnosis
Let us assume that we have a Theorist default theory for the diagnosisof a system where SD is taken
to be the set of facts and the default set is
￿
￿
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿ COMP
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As observed above, the Theorist model for such a theory is precisely the CB-model for this system.
If we restrict Theorist explanations to those of the form used for consistency-based diagnosis, some
interesting relationshipsemerge.
SupposethatTheoristexplanationsarerestrictedtohavetheform
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (or
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). Wewillcall
these explanations Theorist diagnoses. Such weak explanations are then guaranteed to be predictive.
This is due simplyto the fact that the most plausible worlds at which such an explanation holds must
lie within a single cluster. In other words, Theorist diagnoses have a single extension.
Proposition 5.8 Let
￿
￿ COMP.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
(Similarly for
￿
￿
￿
￿ .)
Should we model a system in Theorist as we do for consistency-based diagnosis, then Theorist
diagnoses are exactly predictive diagnoses as we have deﬁned in the consistency-based framework.
As we have seen, many (if not most) observations cannot be predicted in the consistency-based
framework, especially if fault-models are lacking or incomplete. This indicates that the abductive
approach to diagnosis requires information of a form different from that used in the consistency-
based approach. This is emphasized by Poole [45]. However, given complete fault models, Theorist
diagnoses and consistency-based diagnoses will coincide. Konolige [31] has also examined the
relationship between the two forms of diagnosis.
Without complete information, the Theorist system, in particular the notion of an extension,
can still be used to effect consistency-based diagnosis. While a CB-diagnosis may not predict an
observation, it does require that the observation is consistentwith all other “predictions.” In Theorist
terms, the observationis consistentwith the (single) extensionof the diagnosis. In other words, these
are might explanations in the Theorist model.
Theorem 5.9 Let SD and COMP describe some system,
￿
￿ COMP, and
￿ be the set of defaults
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿ COMP
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for observation
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where
￿
is the
(only) Theorist extension of
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Corollary 5.10
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for observation
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Thus, consistency-based diagnosis can be captured in the Theorist abductive framework without
requiring that the form of the system description be altered. SD is simply used as the set of facts
￿
. Poole [45] also deﬁnes a form of consistency-based diagnosis within Theorist. He shows that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ isa “consistency-based diagnosis”iff
￿
￿
￿
￿ is insome extensionof SD
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Our notionof
consistency-based diagnosis in Theorist does not rely on forming extensions of the observation, but
(more in the true spirit of abduction) examines extensions and predictions of the explanation itself.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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This is important because our deﬁnition captures all CB-diagnoses. Poole’s deﬁnition is based on
Reiter’s [49] deﬁnition of diagnosis in terms of minimal sets of abnormal components. It is not hard
to see that, in fact,
￿
￿
￿
￿ is in some extension of SD
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a minimal CB-diagnosis.
While Poole’s observation is correct for minimal diagnoses (and Reiter’s formulation, in particular),
it cannot be extended to the more general case subsequently developed by de Kleer, Mackworth and
Reiter.
Console and Torasso [13] have also explored the distinction between abductive and consistency-
baseddiagnosisandpresentadeﬁnitionofexplanation(inthestyleofReiter)thatcombinesbothtypes.
The set of observations to be explained are divided into two classes: those which must be predicted
by an explanation and those which must simply be rendered consistent by the explanation. We can,
of course, capture such explanations conditionally by using both predictive and weak explanations.
Roughly, if
￿
is the part of the observation that needs to be predicted and
￿ is the component that
must be consistent with the explanation (and background theory) then we simply require that any
explanation
￿ be such that
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented some general conditions on epistemic explanations, describing a number of
different types of explanations, and why certain explanations are to be preferred to others. Our
account relies heavily on a model of belief revision and conditional sentences. The defeasible nature
of explanations and preferences for plausible explanations are induced naturally by the properties of
our revisionmodel. We have alsoshown how the twomain paradigmsfor model-based diagnosiscan
be embedded in our conditional framework.
A number of avenues remain to be explored. We are currently investigating how our model
might be extended to incorporate causal explanations. Such explanations, especially in diagnostic
and planning tasks, are of particular interest. Grafting a representation of causal inﬂuences onto our
modelof explanation,such asthatof Goldszmidtand Pearl [27], seemslikea promisingwayinwhich
to(qualitatively)capture causal explanations. Konolige[32]hasexploredthe useofcausal theoriesin
diagnosisasameanstoobviatetheneedforfaultmodels. Hisrepresentationintermsofdefaultcausal
nets allows both explanations and excuses; but the causal component of his representation remains
essentiallyunanalyzed. Thekeyfeatures ofKonolige’stheoriescan becaptured inourframework ina
rather straightforwardway. Theseincludeexemptionsof“faults,”distinguishingnormalityconditions
from primitivecauses andpreferences for normaland idealexplanations. Thisisdue to theﬂexibility
of the conditionallogic and the generality of plausibilityorderings. We also hope to explore the issueTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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of designing tests to discriminate potential diagnoses, and the trade-off between further testing and
repair. This is an issue that has recently attracted much attention [19, 39].
The pragmatics of explanation remains an importantavenue to pursue. Ways in which to rule out
weak or strong explanations, depending on context must be addressed. Another pragmatic concern
has to do with the elaborationof explanations. We have assumed that explanations are given relative
to background theory. If an explanation is questioned, or elaboration is requested, this may be due to
thefactthatcertainbackgroundisnotsharedbetweentheabductivesystemandtheuserrequestingthe
explanation. Mechanismswith which the appropriate background knowledgecan be determined, and
offered as elaboration, would be of crucial interest. The manner in which an explanation is requested
by a user can also provide clues as to what form an explanation should take [58].
Otherformsofexplanationcannotbecapturedinourframework,atleastinitscurrentformulation.
An important type of explanation is of the form addressed by the theory of G¨ ardenfors [22]. There
an explanation is simply required to render an observation more plausible than it was before the
explanationwas adopted. Asan example, consider possibleexplanationsforFred’s havingdeveloped
AIDS(
￿ ). Apossible(evenreasonable)explanationisthatFredpracticed“unsafe”sex(
￿
). However,
it would seem that adopting the belief
￿
is not sufﬁcient to induce the belief that Fred contracted
HIV and developed AIDS. Furthermore, if the probability is low enough, this might not even be a
valid might explanation;that is,
￿
￿
￿
￿ . However,
￿
does increase the likelihoodof
￿ (even if not
enough to render
￿ believable, or even epistemically possible). Such explanations mightbe captured
by comparing the relative plausibility of
￿ given
￿
and
￿ alone, without appeal to probabilities.
Such an example may suggest a role for decision-theoretic versions of conditional defaults. While
￿
may be unlikely given
￿
, the consequences of developing AIDS are so drastic that one may adopt
a default
￿
￿
￿ : one should act as if
￿ given
￿
. Preliminary investigations of such defaults, in
a conditional setting, may be found in [42, 8]. These may lead to a “practical” form of explanation,
with some basis in rational action.
On a related note, our model can be extended with probabilistic information. Boutilier [5]
shows how the notion of counterfactual probabilities can be grafted onto the conditional logic
CO. Probabilistic information can then be used to determine explanations of the type described by
G¨ ardenfors, explanationsthatare“almostpredictive”andtodistinguishequallyplausibleexplanations
on probabilistic grounds. This should allow a very general model of explanation and diagnosis.
We should also remark that the conditional framework allows arbitrary orderings of preference.
The orderings described above for Theorist and consistency-based diagnosis are merely illustrative.
Generally, orderings need not be determined by default violation and set inclusion. One may, for
example, decide that worlds violatingthe system description of some artifact are more plausible thanTo appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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worlds where a large number of system components have failed. So if some observation can only be
diagnosedwithalargenumberoffailures, onemayprefertoadoptthehypothesisthatthemodelofthe
system is in fact inaccurate. Such a viewpoint would be necessary in system design and veriﬁcation.
Finally, we have neglected an important class of explanation, namely, observations that are
explainedbyappealtocausalorscientiﬁclaws. Ourexplanationshavetakenforgrantedabackground
theory withappropriate conditionalinformation. However, especially inthe realm of scientiﬁctheory
formation, explanations are often causal laws that explain observed correlations. Such explanations
require a model of belief revision that allows one to revise a theory with new conditionals. One such
model is proposed in [11] and may provide a starting point for such investigations.
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A Proofs of Main Theorems
Proposition 3.1 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof Let
￿
beanappropriate
￿
-revisionmodelforthecontractionandrevisionfunctioninquestion.
We have
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
is true at each
￿ -world in
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , i.e., iff
￿
holds at
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (since
￿
￿
￿
). This holds iff there is no
￿ -world in min
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
Proposition 3.2 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.1.
￿
Proposition 3.3 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿ (predictively) explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then condition (A),
￿
￿
￿
, holds trivially (since
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿
￿ min
￿
￿
￿ ).
￿
Proposition 3.4 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿ (predictively) explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, then min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Thus, min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
Proposition 3.5 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿ (predictively) explains
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.3.
￿
Proposition 3.6 If
￿ is a predictive explanation for
￿
then
￿ is a might explanation for
￿
.To appear, Artificial Intelligence, 1995
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Proof The condition (ES) for predictive explanations guarantees the condition (F) for might expla-
nations, while
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
4
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(for satisﬁable
￿ ).
￿
Proposition 3.7 If
￿ is a weak explanation for
￿
then
￿ is a might explanation for
￿
.
Proof
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
4
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(for satisﬁable
￿ ).
￿
Proposition 3.8 Let
￿
￿
￿
and
￿ be a predictive explanation for
￿
. Then
￿ is a preferred (hypo-
thetical) explanation for
￿
in
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof This follows immediatelyfrom Proposition 3.1 and the fact that
￿ is epistemically possiblein
belief state
￿
￿
￿ (due to the fact that any explanation
￿ must be in
￿
).
￿
Proposition 3.9 Let
￿ be a predictive explanation for
￿
relative to model
￿
. Then
￿ is a preferred
explanation iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof This fact holds trivially for accepted and indeterminate
￿
, since there is a unique minimal
￿
-
cluster (those
￿
-worlds satisfying
￿
), and it mustintersect
￿
￿
￿ if
￿ isa predictive explanation.
Suppose
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
If
￿
￿
￿
￿ , then there is some minimal
￿
-cluster
￿
such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for each
￿
￿
￿
. Since
￿
predictively explainsitself (see below), we note that
￿
is a strictlypreferred to
￿ . To see this,
notice that for any
￿
￿
￿
we have
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (since
￿
￿
￿
, and any such
￿
is in min
￿
￿
￿ ).
If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , then each minimal
￿
-cluster
￿
contains some
￿ -world. Thus, we have
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ :
￿ is at least as plausible as
￿
. Clearly, no explanation
￿
￿
of
￿
is more plausible
than
￿
(for then
￿
￿
￿
￿
is impossible). Thus,
￿ is preferred.
￿
Proposition 4.5
￿
is an extension of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof By deﬁnition of
￿
￿
and Proposition 4.4,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿ consists of the set of worlds
satisfying
￿
￿
￿
, where
￿
￿
￿ is some maximal subset of defaults consistent with
￿
. By
deﬁnition of an extension,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some extension
￿
.
￿
Theorem 4.7
￿ is predicted (in Theorist sense) from default theory
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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Proof We have that
￿ is predicted iff
￿ is in all extensions of
￿
. By Proposition4.5, this is the case
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Since min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , this holds iff
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
Theorem 4.8 Let
￿
￿
￿
. Then
￿ isa Theoristexplanationfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
is consistent.
Proof
￿ is a Theorist explanation for
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
for some
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is
consistent. This is equivalent to
￿
belonging to some extension of the (consistent) set
￿
￿
￿ ,
which holds (by Proposition 4.5) iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ relative to
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿
Theorem 4.9 Let
￿
￿
￿
. Then
￿ is a predictive Theorist explanationfor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿ is consistent.
Proof This follows immediately from Deﬁnition 8 and Theorem 4.7.
￿
Theorem 4.10 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
be predictive Theorist explanations for
￿
, relative to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof By deﬁnition of
￿
￿ ,
￿ ispreferred to
￿
￿
iff each subset of defaults
￿
￿
consistentwith
￿
￿
￿
￿
is contained in some subset of defaults
￿
consistent with
￿
￿
￿
. By deﬁnition of
￿
￿
and
Proposition 4.4, this is the case iff each world satisfying
￿
￿
￿
￿
sees some world satisfying
￿
￿
￿
, iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
Proposition 4.19 Let
￿
￿
be the Brewka model for
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
the Theorist model for its
reduction
￿
￿
￿ 1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
￿
whenever
￿
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
￿
.
Proof If
￿
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
, then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ relative to the ﬂat set of defaults
￿ . Clearly then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for each
￿ relative to the prioritized set of defaults. By deﬁnition,
￿
￿
￿
in
￿
￿
.
￿
Theorem 4.20 If
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
Proof By Proposition 4.19, it is clear that the set of minimal
￿ -worlds in the Brewka model
￿
￿
is
a subset of the minimal
￿ -worlds in the Theorist model
￿
￿
. Thus, if
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
then
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
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Theorem 5.3 Let SD and COMP determine some system.
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for observation
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is an excuse for
￿
relative to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof Bydeﬁnition,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ isanexcusefor
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Wenotethatthis
relationcan holdonlyif
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SDisconsistent. GiventhisconsistencyandProposition5.2,
wehavethat
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ isanexcuseiff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
(thisfollowsfromthevalid
schematicentailmentof
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ from
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). ThisholdsiffSD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
is consistent iff
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for
￿
.
￿
Theorem 5.4
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a preferred diagnosisiff
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a minimal diagnosis.
Proof This follows immediately from the deﬁnition of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
Theorem 5.6 Assume that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD is consistent.
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a predictive diagnosis for
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
Proof We observe that min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿ consists of the set of all worlds satisfying
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD by
deﬁnition of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
iff SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
, i.e., iff
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a predictive diagnosis. By Proposition 5.2,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
Proposition 5.8 Let
￿
￿ COMP.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
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Proof As observed above, the set of clusters in the model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are distinguished by the set
of components they take to be normal and abnormal. This means that the sets
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ are singletons consisting of a single cluster each, these clusters being exactly
min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and min
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ respectively. Thus,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿
Theorem 5.9 Let SD and COMP describe some system,
￿
￿ COMP, and
￿ be the set of defaults
￿
￿ ab
￿
￿
￿ :
￿
￿ COMP
￿ . Then
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for observation
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
where
￿
is the
(only) Theorist extension of
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
Proof We assume that SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is consistent. By Theorem 5.3,
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a CB-diagnosis for
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
As indicated in the proof of Proposition5.8, there is a unique minimal SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ -cluster
in
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ; and as described in Section 4, this cluster determines the Theorist extension
￿
of
SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Thus,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ SD
￿
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿